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ABSTRACT 
Mining Merensky reef successfully at Booysendal Mine will require a machine 
which enhances team efficiencies delivering results on specified operational and 
quality parameters. The operational objective of the Booysendal Mine trial of the 
3108 ADE Roof bolter was to prove that this machine can mine at 1900 mm 
stoping width and to set a base for KPIs. The purpose of the upgraded 3108 ADE 
machine was to achieve to drill and install a bolt in 8 minutes translating in 3 
bords supported per shift. This machine had to deliver 235m, 1900 m² per month 
at stoping width of 1900mm translating to 2.55g/ton in terms of head grade. 
The objective of this study is to assess the use of industrial engineering 
techniques to expedite the implementation of a roofbolter in the challenging 
environment at Booysendal Mine. The process of creating a learning environment 
is one of the important goals in many business improvement frameworks, and 
underlies the work done here. 
To deliver on the above mentioned objectives, this research presents a case 
study in the use of several industrial engineering techniques: 
 Lean Manufacturing tools were used to draw up effective communication 
channels for Operators engagement, visible performance data gathering 
and performance monitoring.  
 Observational research methods were used to assess and evaluate the 
impact of 3108a modifications in achieving the set KPIs per shift in a real 
underground situation.  
 The A3 report process was used as the framework to communicate the 
process of the 3108a machine Roll-out to people on the team.  
Theory suggests that the method of implementation presented here will create a 
learning environment, which will in turn meet production targets.  
The implementation team had set itself a number of production targets, primarily 
a demand for 42 bolts per shift to be installed and stoping width to be controlled 
to 1900mm. The targets were based both on benchmarks elsewhere and on 
economic demands at the mine. 
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The study shows that through a step-to-step improvement approach the 
Operators improved from installing less than 19 bolts per shift to move to 19 – 34 
bolts per shift. The 1900mm stoping width target was not consistently achieved.  
In this study, the author played the role of Project Champion, actioning the 
knowledge acquired when attending the CMMS courses and applied tools/tactics 
learned from Trackless Mining and Operations Management courses and tools 
such as Lean Manufacturing, A3 reports and physical observations.  
The main thrust of this study was to answer this central question: How well will a 
set of industrial engineering tools work to improve the modified GHH bolter 
performance to enable the Merensky shaft to efficiently mine at a stoping width of 
1900mm consistently? The research shows that detailed improvement approach 
delivered more bolts drilled and installed per shift. The report goes further and 
gives practical on-site implementation team actions taken to ensure a machine 
delivers 3 bords per shift. Where the implementation team identified challenges 
outside the scope of this study for addressing the stoping width, the team gave 
recommendations to relevant technical team on-mine. 
The tools performed well: 
  The most successful tool was the use of visual indicators and other elements 
of communication from Lean to engage Operators and encourage the use of 
gathering data for process improvement because key feature of Lean is its 
ability to manage a large number and variety of issues simultaneously using 
visual prompts to assist in communication of issues. 
 Lean promotes “going to the Gemba” – managers need to see exactly how 
things really work. The observational tools used in this implementation 
showed the value of physical observations because even if 8 minutes per 
installed bolts was not achieved the implementation team knew exactly where 
the constraints were and how to tackle it. 
 The A3 methodology was an effective way of structuring and managing the 
improvement process in the implementation of the Roof bolter. Through the 
stepped approach in this case study we managed to deliver exceptional 
production results six months ahead of planned timeframe. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Mining Background and Rationale 
The Booysendal mining right is located within the southern compartment of the 
Eastern Limb of the Bushveld Complex. It is approximately 35km from the town 
of Mashishing (formerly Lydenburg), and straddles the border of Limpopo and 
Mpumalanga provinces in South Africa. (Northam Platinum Limited, 2017). 
The property hosts the PGM-bearing UG2 and Merensky orebodies, both 
outcropping along an extensive strike length. The characteristics of these 
orebodies allow a mechanised mining approach, with relatively shallow 
underground mining operations, developed in a modular fashion. (Northam 
Platinum Limited, 2017). 
 
Figure 1a: Whole Bushveld Complex and the magnified Eastern Limb  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
Both the UG2 and Merensky reefs dips at 11° from East to West. The 
Booysendal Mine lease area extends over 14.5km on strike and 10km on dip 
(refer to Figure 1a). In this research project, I focus only on the Merensky North 
Mine area. The area extends over 3.8km on strike and 2.1km on dip, the 
approach being to mine 25 000 tons per month over 4 years and in the next 
phase to increase production to 75 000 tons per month full capacity (refer to 
Figure 1b for Booysendal Mine. The Merensky Shaft is the area in light orange.) 
It is against the above shortened description of the Booysendal Mine operations 
that the author needs to bring in extracts of talks given by the Northam Platinum 
 
Booysendal
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Mine executives to the markets and the significance of mining the Merensky reef 
in the Eastern Limb.  
 
Figure 1b: Localised plan specific to Booysendal Lease Area  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
Booysendal Mine has both the UG2 and the Merensky reefs in its lease area. For 
the last 6 years the UG2 orebody has been mined with an exceptional degree of 
success. In February 2015, a decision was taken to do a Merensky Shaft bulk 
sample. It proved to be a viable mining proposition, provided the stoping height 
could consistently be maintained at maximum 1900mm (see Figure 1b for 
Merensky North Shaft Area). 
Booysendal Mine has 48Moz reserves of UG2 reef in its lease area. The 
reserves have a significant economic value for Northam Platinum when they are 
mined successfully.  
The company strategy has always been to start up projects on either UG2 or 
Merensky in modular phases. Other mines in the Eastern Limb mine UG2 
therefore it also made practical sense for Northam Platinum to start with UG2 
mining.  
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The UG2 North Mine has been successful for 6 years, however its concentrate 
has high moisture content. This poses recovery challenges at the company 
smelter in Thabazimbi.  
Booysendal Mine has also 36Moz of Merensky reef in its lease area. It has a high 
content of nickel and copper as compared to UG2 reef. Besides the significant 
economic value of the Merensky reef, when it is blended with UG2 concentrate 
the result is better PGMs recovery at the smelter. Despite the fact that no 
company has ever mined the Merensky reef’s thin stratigraphic width 
successfully for a long period, NPL, aware of the challenges involved, took a 
decision to do so. 
The NPL CEO, Paul Dunne, addressed the markets and specifically JPMorgan 
mining analysts on 30 June 2016. Here are extracts from that speech. 
 “The Management outlined three expansion phases for the Booysendal Mine 
that will grow production to 475kozpa 4E (FY15: 122koz) by FY22.  
 The first expansion phase (ongoing) will add 25kozpa 4E by mining the 
Merensky reef at the existing Booysendal North Mine, with a capital cost of 
R300m spent over two years. The Management sees the Merensky reef 
output as “swing” production with the option to increase mining as and when 
required. It sees an option to increase Booysendal North Merensky output to 
75kozpa (from 25kozpa currently planned), market conditions permitting.  
 The second expansion phase (deepening UG2) involves adding two 
additional levels to the Booysendal North UG2 Mine at a capital cost of 
R270m over three years. This will add 30kozpa 4E to the mine’s capacity (for 
a total of 260kozpa) and will, in our view, likely require commissioning the 
installed DMS plant to ensure sufficient concentrating capacity.  
 The third phase of expansion envisages exploiting the Booysendal Central 
and South Mines through the development of a new portal system near the 
middle of the greater Booysendal property. This portal system is to be used to 
establish at least two declines that will tap into the BS1 and BS2 portion of 
the orebody. The ore mined will be transported via a Ropecon (or rope 
conveyor) to the Everest processing site.  
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 This expansion is planned to deliver 230ktpm of ore (or 215kozpa 4E) at 
steady state and requires a capital spend of R4.2bn over six years. These 
three expansions will grow Booysendal Mine production from its current 
throughput of 160kozpa to 475kozpa.” 
Not one mine in the Eastern Limb of the Bushveld complex is currently mining the 
Merensky reef using the trackless mechanized method. The achieved mill head 
grade at the normal 2.2m Low Profile (LP) stoping height and increased dilution 
means it is not a financially viable business.  
The obvious opportunity then lies in a mechanised application where the reef is 
mined at a reduced stoping height. Booysendal Mine gave GHH Mining an 
opportunity to do a trial at the Merensky Shaft to prove the 3108 ADE bolter’s 
capability in a 1.9m mining environment. 
This project aimed to optimise the operation of the modified 3108 ADE bolter.  
First, the project ensured that the Operator was safe from harm through the 
addition of certain features in the new bolter. As a close out for the trial stage, a 
formalised Change Management process ensures all Operators are now 
informed of the new features and their applications. 
Second, the project actioned a number of operations Management processes to 
set the baseline productivity and then applied a step approach to increase 
productivity to target levels.  
Lastly, the project benchmarked its achievement with other mines productivity 
levels gathered through literature review. 
1.2 Objectives 
The objective of this study is to assess the use of industrial engineering 
techniques to expedite the implementation of a Roof bolter in the challenging 
environment at Booysendal Mine. The process of creating a learning environment 
is one of the important goals in many business improvement frameworks, and 
underlies the work done here in order to achieve the following output KPIs: 
To produce 1 900m² with a 235m system face advance per month in a stoping to 
yield 11 500 tons per rig section at a defined stoping width of 1 900mm. To 
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achieve that desired output, the 3108a ADE bolter must perform as per the 
following KPIs: 
(i) Drill and install a 1.75m resin applied rock bolt in 8 mins. 
(ii) Bolt installation times, including movement between bords, should be 
in the region of 2 hrs allowing for the flexibility of supporting 3 bords in 
the available 7 hrs face time. 
(iii) For 3 bords to be completely supported, the Roof bolter must install 
42 bolts per shift. 
(iv) The bolter must be able to install bolts in stoping widths ranging from 
1700 to 2000 mm to achieve the defined stoping width of 1900 mm. 
In trials (Booysendal Mine June 2016 – Dec 2016), the bolter was not 
consistently achieving its KPIs. The objective of this research work was to 
optimise operation of the Roof bolter so that it could achieve Roof bolt drilling and 
installation in 8 minutes.  
It needs to be stated that at 90% availability of the drill rig machine and 90% 
availability of the Roof bolter machine, if the stoping section manages to blast 
only 4 bords in 24 hours, it will only achieve 214m which equates to 1 710m² - not 
the expected production output.  
With the same availability scenario of 90% for each machine, if the blast 
achieved is 5 bords in 24 hours, even if the blast rate is 90% per month, the 
section will achieve 235m and 1 900m² per month. If we take this a step further 
and achieve 6 bords in 24 hours with 90% availabilities on both pieces of 
equipment, even if the blast rate is 95% per month, the section will achieve 300m 
and 2 400m² per month. Clearly, a lesser number of bords supported per month 
will not only affect the mining cycle, but will result in less than expected 
production output per month.  
The mining cycle differs completely from the manufacturing sector in that there 
are set blasting times and scientifically determined post blast re-entry periods. 
Missing a blast cannot be made up by working overtime in 24 hours.  
After fully explaining the main objectives of this research, it needs to be stated 
that there’s a well-entrenched belief that Roof bolting is the main constraint in the 
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mining cycle among the most experienced mechanised mine Operators in South 
Africa. According to them, two main areas need to be looked at if this technology 
is to be successfully implemented; namely the process and the people. 
 Technological change will increase the Total Factor Productivity Index (TFPI) 
by increasing the efficiency of output per unit input (Green, cited in Neingo, 
2014). This is proven in coal mining, which is highly mechanised compared to 
hard rock underground mining. The use of continuous miners (CM) in coal 
mining, which is currently coupled with continuous haulage, minimises the 
effect of human factors on productivity. In other words, productivity is more 
reliant in coal mining on the availability and utilisation of CM.  
Felske, cited by Wojciechowski, described new product development as the 
only direction in which Canada has a real technological advantage and is the 
only direction for significant economic gains for the industry (Neingo, 2014). 
 An improvement in human capital will increase economic efficiency. A skilled 
and experienced workforce can obviously improve the quantity of output per 
unit of input (Green, cited in Neingo, 2014). Poor labour skills and negative 
attitudes can be significant sources of productivity problems, although 
Management is responsible for correcting these attitudes (Wojciechowski, 
cited in Neingo, 2014). 
While the author is fully aware of the above two areas of concern raised by other 
researchers, it means the objectives of this new machine Roll-out must take into 
account the non-physical aspects of machine adoption. 
1.3 Statement of the problem 
The success of a properly implemented machine Roll-out in a typical mechanised 
trackless mine, such as Booysendal Mine, is the fleet suite’s ability to complete 
the mining cycle within a specified shift period.  
A mining cycle comprises four main activities:  
 Loading and hauling  
 Supporting 
 Drilling 
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 Charging and blasting.  
It is defined by blasting at the end of shift at times specifically set by the mine. If 
any steps in the mining cycle take too long then the blast will not happen.  
In a trackless bord and pillar method once a mining section is out of cycle during 
the 24 working days a month it becomes difficult and complex to get back into the 
cycle again. As a result, the mining section won’t achieve its planned monthly 
production. The ripple effect of this will result in a failed mechanised mining 
system Roll-out.  
It is against this context that the author intended to fully understand the 
successes and the failures of the GHH bolter implementation approach; the 
physical modifications done from trial stage to final adapted machine. He also 
needed to understand how this new machine was introduced to Roof bolter 
Operators, maintenance crew and the miner of the section.  
The challenge that this Project had is there are no previous trackless Merensky 
mines in the Eastern Limb against which to benchmark the performance. The 
author used Roof bolter performance information available for UG2 and chrome 
trackless mines for comparison and benchmarking instead. 
1.4 Scope 
Although this project looks at the implementation of a GHH bolter in a 1 700 – 1 
900mm stoping width environment, it must be stated the main aim is not to 
promote a certain OEM machine. It is, however, to critically examine why other 
successful mechanised mines in South Africa in similar environments are still 
using hand-held machines for bolting and what was their technology transfer 
approach.  
For a critical investigation and examination of mines at 1 700 – 1 900mm stoping 
widths, four mines were looked at through literature review and some on-site 
underground observations were done as well as the application of the author’s 
own extensive practical experience of trackless mine operations.  
It was while examining mine operations in this context that the author extended 
his scope to examine the successes of the XLP suite application at Anglo 
American’s Bathopele Mine. Various technical reports and research projects 
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have fully unpacked the bolting successes of Bathopele Mine as well as stating 
the bolting challenges which still need to be fully researched.  
The Roll-out of the GHH bolter machine at the Merensky Shaft focused on the 
following:  
 Trial stage implementation and findings  
 Change Management with the new modified machine 
 Observational research methods to improve machine efficiency  
 Analysis of operational results achieved and residual challenges identified 
The research had to answer this main question: How well will a set of industrial 
engineering tools work to improve the modified GHH bolter performance to 
enable the Merensky shaft to efficiently mine at a stoping width of 1900mm 
consistently? 
1.5 Importance of the study 
Early successes of the Merensky Shaft outputs in the Eastern Limb have already 
sparked interest in other mining houses operating in this area. They are starting 
to have critical conversations about the value of supplementing UG2 production 
by adding Merensky reef mining. The author intends to unpack the impact and 
meaning of the GHH bolter Roll-out in four different mining areas.  
Before unpacking the impact, the following two figures will contextualise what the 
author intends to assert (Figure 1c and Appendix 5 Figure 5(i)). 
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Figure 1c: Difference between UG2 and Merensky reefs in the Eastern Limb 
Area  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
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As per the best cut diagrams shown in Figure 1c, it is important to understand 
that the stoping width has to be below 1 900mm. If the stoping width is 
maintained at levels higher than 1 900mm there will profound negative financial 
implications due to: 
 Increased dilution means the concentrator recoveries will be lower than 
expected. 
 Increased costs in both mining and concentrator will be incurred – mining will 
have to move additional unpayable tons at a cost and the concentrator ore 
flow will take longer due to the excess tons delivered. 
 The mining sections will have to mine additional areas than initially planned to 
compensate for the lower-than-planned shaft head grade. This has additional 
cost implications to the mine. 
If the project execution is successful and we are able to mine between 
1 700mm to 1 900mm, what does that mean to the Booysendal Platinum 
Mine, Northam Platinum Mine, Eastern Limb Mines and Metallurgy 
fraternity? 
 To Booysendal Mine, as per the strategic plan to increase the total output to 
475kozpa by FY2022; Any experienced mine Operator will acknowledge this 
steep production ramp-up will have to be backed by rigorous project 
implementation processes. Even if the processes are solid and sound, the 
successful execution of the Merensky Module 1 Project will provide leverage 
should there be a delay in the Central Mine coming on stream as per the 
project schedule.  
At NPL’s top Management level, there are already strategic conversations 
happening about initiating scoping and pre-feasibility studies of either one or 
two similar Merensky modular type shafts at the Central Mine. The capital 
expenditure at the Merensky Shaft will yield positive financial results for the 
mine especially when the basket price increases and the mine reaps the full 
benefits of the price upswing. 
 The UG2 concentrate from Booysendal Mine has high moisture content; this 
ranges in the lower 20%. This poses a significant smelter recovery challenge 
at the Zondereinde Smelter in Thabazimbi.  
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To ensure that smelter recoveries are optimised, NPL purchases the 
Merensky run-of-mine ore (ROM) from the Plianesberg Mines. This ROM is 
put through the concentrator and then the UG2 concentrate from Booysendal 
Mine is blended with Merensky concentrate at ratios specified by 
metallurgists running the smelter to optimally recover the 4E PGMs.  
Over and above the benefit of increasing the UG2 recoveries, the Merensky 
Shaft ore has a significant content of nickel and copper. These by-products 
are also further processed to yield significant financial returns to the 
company. Due to the financial sensitivities in the competitive mining 
environment, the author would rather not specify the percentages of Ni and 
Cu. Its profit contribution percentages will not be mentioned either.  
Although NPL still incurs transport costs when moving Merensky Shaft 
concentrate from Booysendal Mine to Zondereinde Smelter, it does benefit by 
replacing the cost of ROM used to pay to other mines.  
 As mentioned in the introduction, there is no single mine in the Eastern Limb 
which mines the Merensky reef due to the thin stratigraphic reef width. This 
width dilemma will be further unpacked in the project’s main central chapters. 
It’s in this context that the mines mining above the Steelpoort fault towards 
north right up until Lebowa Platinum Mine are finding it economically unviable 
to mine this reef in their own ‘proven and entrenched’ conventional hand held 
drilling and blasting method (Steelpoort fault is shown clearly in Figure 1a).  
A similar situation exists with the mines located in the south of the Steelpoort 
fault from Two Rivers Platinum Mine right through to Booysendal Mine lease 
area, even though these mines use the LP mechanised mining methods.  
So, where does the answer lie for these mines to unleash the Merensky reef’s 
dormant economic potential?  
Surely, if there’s a mine that can exploit this reef and have sound control on 
its dilution effect then all mines in the Eastern Limb will start looking at mining 
the Merensky reef. Currently, the mines in the Eastern Limb are using the 
‘wait and see’ approach. They are waiting to see tangible results from the 
Booysendal Merensky Project - most probably for two to three financial years’ 
performance.  
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Some mines have previously attempted the Merensky reef and failed, which 
explains the industry’s cautious approach when planning strategic capital 
projects, especially in this low basket price environment. 
 Metallurgists, both operational and research-based, are now faced with a 
dilemma; designing extraction processes which will blend both UG2 and 
Merensky ROM in the currently existing concentrators and still maintain 
recoveries above minimum of 85%.  
With all four concern and opportunity areas mentioned above, there’s one 
main opportunity aspect that has not been mentioned. Between the UG2 reef 
plane and Merensky reef plane in the Eastern Limb, the middling is 170 – 
180m and this allows both reefs to be mined concurrently.  
This is not the case in the Western Limb mines where the middling ranges 
between 36 – 40m, making co-extraction of both reefs impossible due to rock 
engineering challenges posed by stressed and destressed mining zones. 
1.6 Trial stage findings 
The Booysendal Mine trial for the GHH Roof bolter (model type 3108 ADE) 
started in June 2016 and was closed out six months later in December 2016.  
The trial’s main purpose was to test and prove the 3108 ADE’s capability to 
support a bord in a Super-Low Profile environment – a stoping width 
between 1 700 – 1 900mm. The trial looked at three different types of bolts: 
18mm rock bolts, 18mm ‘spin to stall’ bolts and 25mm rock bolts. The 
method of drilling during the trial was the rotary drilling mode, as compared 
to rotary-percussive mode used in other machines.  
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this report will further unpack the trial stage results 
and the physical modifications that were done on the 3108 ADE bolter to 
modify it to 3108a ADE. 
In the application of a SLP type bolter, coupled with the rotary drilling 
mechanisms, it would be unwise not to challenge the norms of rock bolt 
combinations as far as adhesive application and bolt support characteristics 
are concerned, so different rock bolt combinations were tested in this project. 
It is difficult to quantify the non-tangible benefits derived from the use of 
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smaller diameter drilling consumables and associated equipment, but the 
outcome and cost effectiveness of the measurable items are listed below.  
The following operational criteria installing 1,75m rock bolts was achieved 
during the trial period: 
(Note: Bolt yield stress and support resistance in all cases are within 
acceptable limits)   
a) 35mm hole diameters with 25mm rock bolt and related resin 
combination: 
 Best bolt installation times – 7.4 mins/bolt 
 Average bolt installation times – 9.2 mins/bolt 
 Number of bolts per bord – 14 bolts 
 Number of replacement bolts per bord, replacement bolts are due 
to either damaged bolts or incorrectly installed bolts – 3 bolts 
 Indicated number of bords per 7 hr shift cycle – 2 bords 
b) 25mm hole diameters with 18mm bolt and related resin combination: 
 Best bolt installation times – 6.3 mins/bolt 
 Average bolt installation times – 8.0 mins/bolt 
 Number of bolts per bord – 14 bolts 
 Number of replacement bolts per bord, replacement bolts are due 
to either damaged bolts or incorrectly installed bolts – 3 bolts 
 Indicated number of bords per 7 hr shift cycle – 2 bords 
c) 18 mm bolting with “spin to stall” resin application: 
 Reduction in bolt installation times – 1.08 mins 
 Average bolt installation times – 6.4 mins/bolt 
 Indicated number of bords per 7 hr shift cycle – 3 bords 
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The conclusion from the trial was to take the 25mm hole 18mm diameter Roof 
bolt to implementation stage. Although the 18mm “spin to stall” bolts achieved 6 
bords supported per 24 hours with ease, it did not pass certain rock engineering 
specifications that were required. The challenge with the 25mm hole 18mm rock 
bolt is that it consistently delivered only 4 bords in 24 hours. In sub-section 1.2 of 
this report the author mentioned that 4 bords will yield only 214m per month and 
it still be 21m below the expected production output. The results of this trial sets a 
base for the case study and the base is as follows: We have an operational 
problem, we want to mechanise roof bolting, but performance is inadequate. 
To achieve 235m per month per mining section the GHH bolter has to install a 
minimum of 5 bords in 24 hours at 90% blasting rate to deliver the 1 900m² per 
month. To achieve that target, 42 bolts need to be installed in a 7.5 hour shift, 
translating to minimum of 6 bolts/hour. 
1.7 Methodology  
This case study will seek to entrench the performance achieved in the 3108 ADE 
bolter trial first, and then focus on its operational effectiveness to achieve 235m 
on monthly basis. 
For this to be done, the following industrial engineering techniques will be used: 
 Lean Manufacturing tools were used to draw up effective communication 
channels for Operators engagement, visible performance data gathering 
and performance monitoring.  
 Observational research methods were used to assess and evaluate the 
impact of 3108a modifications in achieving the set KPIs per shift in a real 
underground situation.  
 Experienced mechanised mining personnel were used to conduct time-
and-motion time studies whilst the machines were physically operating at 
the faces underground. 
 The A3 report process was used as the framework to communicate the 
process of the 3108a machine Roll-out to people on the team.  
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The following implementation Champions assisted in doing observations and 
sharing practical experience so that appropriate adaptations can be made: 
(i) Project Champion: the author of this report (Wonderboy Kekana) – 
has 17 years’ operational experience on gold, platinum and diamond 
mines. I have experience in conventional, hybrid and mechanised 
mining methods. 
(ii) Operational Technology Champion: Nigel Reeder (Merensky Mine 
M/O with 30 years’ operational mine experience, of which 20 years 
was at middle Management level). 
(iii) Technical Champion: Robin Pearce (GHH Mechanical Engineer with 
over 25 years’ industrial machinery experience). 
(iv) Technical Champion: Cules Kolbe (Ex Mine Manager and Industrial 
Engineer with over 30 years’ mining experience. He was the Project 
Leader implementing mechanisation in one of the Platinum companies 
in South Africa). 
The main modus operandi was to observe, collect data, record results, engage 
Operators and do modifications. 
Being the Mine Manager at Booysendal Mine, and carrying Management 
authority and power to give instructions and make decisions relating to this 
project, the author did this project as part of his work.  
Macfarlane (2001) explains the following concept regarding a project leader, as 
was identified by Kotter, “It is essential to identify a project champion. The project 
champion must have a multi-disciplinary team around him who will assist in the 
successful transfer of the technology. Ideally, the champion should be a senior 
line manager. It is unlikely that any other person will have sufficient power to see 
the project through, or be able to seriously influence the change to the new 
method or technology. Many change initiatives have failed where senior or line 
Management are perceived to be sitting on the fence, not fully supportive, or 
waiting to see what happens before making a firm commitment of support.” This 
must be avoided at all costs.  
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The GHH bolter implementation at the Merensky Shaft was a mini-project that 
enhanced the strategic growth of Merensky greenfield project. As the Mine 
Manager, the author was tasked by the Mine General Manager to lead this Roll-
out. The implementation team’s main members were the author, Nigel, Robin and 
Cules.  
The team conducted briefing sessions with Operators and mining teams using 
flipcharts and posters on a biweekly basis. At the end of each briefing session the 
team followed up by doing physical on-site observations, noting these in their 
field books and taking photographs of the critical Roof bolting sub activities they 
observed. (Refer to Appendix 1 and 3 for Roll-out posters used to communicate 
and get teams understanding, evidence of full team participation and the 
observations done).  
The implementation team planned to do the on-site underground physical 
inspections on Tuesdays and have debrief sessions with Operators and 
maintenance team after each inspection over a period of 24 weeks. Instead of 
the 24 planned inspections, the team managed to do 20 inspections and 20 
debriefs. 
Time study data was conducted by the GHH technical team during the trial stage, 
and this was validated by an independent mining consultant. The other data for 
the full implementation was collected by the experienced trackless mining 
instructors employed by the mine. (See the results of the implementation time 
study in sub-section 4.5 of this report). 
What is observation? 
According to the Department of Health and Human Sciences, (CDC), (2008) 
observation is a way of gathering data by watching behaviour, events, or noting 
physical characteristics in their natural setting.  
Observations can either be direct or indirect. Direct observations are when you 
watch interactions, processes, or behaviours as they occur. (Department of 
Health and Human Sciences, (CDC), (2008)).  
The Booysendal Mine implementation team only interacted with Operators at the 
waiting place during the start of shift briefing sessions. When it came to 
observations, because the team wanted to identify critical steps leading to either 
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failure or success of the bolting activity, the modus operandi was to observe and 
take notes, not interact with the Operator.  
The critical observations were discussed with all the Operators in the follow up 
sessions and a group solution was adopted for chronic recurring operational 
challenges.  
When should you use observation for evaluation?  
First, when you are trying to understand an on-going process or situation. 
Through observation you can monitor or watch a process or situation which you 
are evaluating as it occurs. 
 Second, when you need to know about a physical setting. Seeing the place or 
environment where something takes place can help increase your understanding 
of the event, activity or the situation being evaluated. The Department of Health 
and Human Sciences, (CDC), 2008). Brief 16 of the Evaluation team (2008) 
states that the advantages of direct observations are that field notes can be taken 
while the activity happens, capturing the real uninterrupted acts without relying on 
people’s ability to respond.  
In the case of the Booysendal Mine team, the advantage is that these 
observations are done by experienced team members. In fact, one of the team 
members had two cases of total mechanisation failure in one mine, so he could 
warn the team when identifying issues similar to his failed Roll-outs. 
Is observation the only way to gather information? 
Research by Leicht, Hunter, Saluja and Messner (2010) asserts that while 
quantitative research methods can be very important for answering certain 
research questions, there are important reasons for adopting qualitative or mixed 
methodology studies to gain a better understanding of complex phenomena.  
Observational studies can provide answers to ‘what’ phenomena occurred, 
particularly when people are involved in the process, along with insights into 
‘why’ it occurred. As the implementation team did not have any previous 
experience of the bolter performance in a Merensky environment it would have 
been inappropriate to do a structured observation with pre-set questions since 
the application of this unit is unknown in our current context.  
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It is difficult to determine when observational research methods were first used 
(Wax; Bauer et al., cited in Leicht et al., 2010). These techniques are, in many 
ways, natural steps in the research process.  
Simply stated, if we are curious about why something occurs we are likely to 
seek observations of that phenomenon to more fully understand it.   
What are the two main data gathering methods? 
The use of observational methods within the qualitative data gathering context is 
divided into two main categorisations, usually identified as structured and 
unstructured observation (Yin, cited in Leicht et al., 2010).  
Structured observations rely on frameworks of predefined actions, discussion 
content, or even body language to fit the activity within the variables and scope of 
the research question. By using the existing framework or developing a specific 
framework to track observed activities, the researcher has chosen the 
architecture around which they are fitting the hypothesis and they utilise the data 
from the observations to create correlations between the pieces (Leicht, 2010). 
In contrast to structured observations, an unstructured observation utilises no 
pre-set framework. The concept driving unstructured observation is to have the 
researcher enter into the observations with no preconceptions regarding the 
expected outcomes. The researcher simply records and notes the behaviours in 
question and the trends in the behaviours will emerge with time.  
Along with these, non-frequency techniques and contingency analysis, coding 
whether or not something is used rather than how often, or the absence or 
presence of an attribute may be more significant than the relative frequency of 
other characteristics (Leicht, 2010). 
Was the implementation team biased? 
Although the requirement for a sound unstructured observation is a ‘no 
preconceptions’ requirement, the implementation team members did have some 
biases. Cules and Robin have the experience of the 3108 ADE ‘dry-drilling’ at 
Mimosa Mine. As a result, the initial dry-collaring challenges experienced were a 
non-issue to them, while it was a concern to the on-mine team. Wonderboy and 
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Nigel regarded roto-percussive drilling to be faster than rotary drilling, although 
they had no proven record of their conviction.  
Where do observations start and then stop? 
Although the observations done by the Booysendal Merensky implementation 
team was done by a highly experienced team comprising both OEMs and mine 
operational persons, one may pose the question when do you start and when do 
you end the observations?  
We were guided by the following principle, Merriam (1998) suggests that the 
most important factor determining what a researcher should observe is the 
researcher’s purpose for conducting the study in the first place. “Where to begin 
looking depends on the research question, but where to focus or stop cannot be 
determined ahead of time” (Merriam 1998, cited in Kawulich, 2005). 
1.8 Subsequent Chapters 
This report is divided into six chapters. 
Chapter 1 explains the underlying reasons why this case study was undertaken, 
the impact it will have on Booysendal Mine and the research methodology 
followed. 
Chapter 2 unpacks what the main challenges mechanised mines face with regard 
to Roof bolting and what are the learnings from XLP projects implementation. 
Chapter 3 thoroughly details the GHH bolter trial carried out and the outcomes.  
Chapter 4 unpacks the application of Operations Management or industrial 
engineering tools in implementing the modified GHH bolter and what preliminary 
results have been achieved to date.  
Chapter 5 analyses the results achieved while unpacking the challenges 
experienced and the residual challenges after remedial actions have been 
effected.  
Chapter 6 summarises the observations, conclusions, recommendations and 
further research opportunities arising from residual challenges.  
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2. ROOF BOLTING CHALLENGES ON MECHANISED MINES 
2.1 Background of four trackless mechanised mines  
This chapter will review work written by other researchers on the technology used 
in four Low Profile (LP) mechanised mines (Three mines from Nong’s research 
report and the fourth mine from Pickering’s mechanised mines workshop). It 
looks at both chrome and platinum mines and the author summarises what has 
been documented about the technology Roll-out on these mines.  
However, attention needs also to be drawn to other underlying issues about 
which other technical papers and dissertations are silent and the reasons why.  
Before scrutinising the work done by Nong and Pickering, the author will explain 
basic mechanised and hybrid mine design specifications.  
A mechanised Low Profile (LP) mine has the basic mine design parameters 
typical to the one shown in Figure 2a below. Design specifications vary, some 
mines will prefer 12 bords instead of 9. Access may be via four on-reef barrels 
whilst the fifth is in the footwall to ensure ore surge capacity creation though short 
ore passes (typically 18 – 25m). 
 
Figure 2a: Typical layout of Low Profile (LP) mechanised bord and pillar 
mine showing both macro and micro plans  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
Super Low Profile (SLP) design parameters are exactly the same as LP, the only 
difference is the stoping width varies between 1.7 to 1.9m. 
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The design parameters of an XLP mine 
A mechanised XLP mine has design parameters typical to the one shown in 
Figure 2b below. This method is actually a combination of two mechanised 
processes; the ASDs are developed using LP equipment and the stope panel is 
mined with extra-low profile equipment, specifically built and customised, which 
fits in a 1.2 to 1.7m environment. The ULP operates in the same way manner as 
the XLP the only difference is that the stoping width varies between 0.7 to 1.2 m. 
 
Figure 2b: Typical mining layout of Extra Low Profile (XLP) mechanised 
mine showing both macro and micro plans 
(Source: Pickering (2007) and Fourie (2014)) 
(See Figure 2c for high wall and low wall sides of the bords with their 
accompanying dimensions.) The high wall side of the bord is normally the up-dip 
side and is mined a few centimetres higher than the down-dip side. Low wall is 
on the down-dip side of the bord and is mined at height less that the high wall.  
Exceptions are planned for in the mine design to cover occasions when bords 
mine through complex Geology (potholes, slumps, dykes etc.) then the high wall 
and the low wall are mined at the same height. 
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Figure 2c: Typical Booysendal Merensky bord high wall 1.9m and low wall 1.7m  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
The design parameters of a hybrid mine 
Hybrid Mine Designs are not fully understood by a significant number of mining 
industry participants. While ‘hybrid’ simply means a combination of two mining 
methods, the predominant understanding must be a combination of conventional 
stoping mixed together with mechanised LP stope access development. (See 
Figure 2d below for typical hybrid mine design specifications.) 
 
Figure 2d: Typical mining layout of Hybrid mine showing both macro and 
micro plans  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited and Union Mine Monthly stoping plans) 
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Put simply, mechanised mine design is where the planning and execution of 
actual mining is done using a trackless mining fleet operated by trained, qualified 
and competent Operators. Hybrid mine design is where planning and execution 
of actual mining is done using a combination of hand-held mining equipment and 
a trackless mining fleet. 
Here are extracts from Nong’s (2010) research report on three different mines: 
 Saffy and Hossy are Lonmin shafts situated in the Marikana area. These 
shafts mine only UG2. Both shafts implemented a fully mechanised mining 
method using XLP equipment. Saffy shaft’s implementation failed – the 
reason given was the difficulties experienced with the implementation of the 
mining method and poor production performance. Saffy was changed to a 
hybrid mining method while Hossy remained as a fully mechanised mine.  
Both shafts had a reef dip within 12° which is well within the operating 
gradient for a mechanised mine. The reef width on both shafts goes up to 
1.6m. The Geology has the normal challenges of a typical UG2 reef that 
makes it ideal for a mechanised mining method (as per Figure 2b 
specifications). 
A mechanised mining layout is used to facilitate a working system of in-stope 
and development equipment. The back length varied according to the panel 
sizes which are varied from 26m to up to 32m at Hossy shaft with the stoping 
width at 1.2m. The in-stope development is cut between 3.5 to 4m in width. 
(As per Figure 2b specifications). These dimensions were cut to 
accommodate the equipment and conveyor belt. 
In-stope drilling is done with XLP rigs and support holes are done with the 
bolters in the stopes. In-stope cleaning is done by dozers. The LHDs load 
broken rock from the strike and dip drives and tip it on the conveyor belt.  
The mining philosophy is planned to follow mining cycle of drilling and 
blasting, cleaning and support to ensure the tasks follow each other. This 
proved to be difficult where equipment failure was experienced. The bolter 
was identified as a constraint in the mining cycle. At Hossy hand-held drilling 
crews were introduced to assist the bolters.   
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The report then focuses on operational readiness: 
 The workshop infrastructure 
 The maintenance program 
 Trained Artisans  
 Good communication infrastructure.  
These are really important factors to consider when a mechanised method is to 
be used. However, a weakness in this report is the failure to examine the 
selection of equipment especially the bolters.  
Both Saffy and Hossy shafts failed to realise the complexity of matching XLP 
equipment and LP equipment to ensure a 1.2m stoping width in-stope, and less 
than 2.0m height in the development. An incomplete mining cycle, due to 
unmanaged bolter complexity, led to failure of the production teams to meet its 
expected targets.  
This case study need to identify and use industrial engineering techniques so as 
to mitigate the above mentioned operational problem and also answer this 
question: How do we rectify this in other mining projects? Success will only be 
achieved if appropriately matched in-stope and strike drives equipment is 
selected at the beginning. 
 Although mining operations have common challenges, the most prevalent 
challenge that Impala 12 shaft had was high dilution due to the location of the 
triplets above the main seam. The dilution has been recorded going over 40% 
in some areas resulting in low grade with an average head grade of 3.5 g/t.  
Due to the triplets, the minimum best cut was recommended to be 1.4m 
which included other geological parting planes. However, the decision was 
taken to mine at 1.9m to acquire large volumes of ore at an average grade of 
3.5g/t.  
The Geology has normal UG2 reef challenges, i.e. fall of grounds due to 
hanging wall triplets, reef rolls and potholes, making this area ideal for a 
mechanised mining method (See Figure 2a for a typical LP layout). The reef 
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dips between 6° and 10° which is ideal for mechanised, trackless 
fleet/equipment. 
If the mine planners fully understood the complexity of mixing both the LP and 
XLP systems they wouldn’t plan for only 8 bords per section. If they do, it’s an 
indication that no face length redundancy has been planned for.  
The room and pillar mining method used by Impala 12 Shaft has a section 
consisting of 8 rooms with a conveyor belt located in the middle. The crush 
pillars are designed to be 12m x 4m (length and width) and stability pillars 
12m x 36m (length and width) along the conveyor belt. The stoping width is 
1.9m with rooms of 12m bord length. 
The mining layout uses LP mechanised equipment. The section consists of 
LP development drill rig, LHDs and utility vehicles. The swing or spare LHD is 
shared amongst the three sections to ensure that production is not hampered 
during breakdowns and scheduled maintenance of LHDs in the sections. 
Installation of support Roof bolts is done by hand-held equipment. This 
conventional equipment does not support the complete mechanised system. 
Mine mechanisation must be a complete system where human physical effort 
is minimised in all areas of operation. 
The report then unpacks the challenges experienced by the mine caused by: 
 Failure to maintain roadways  
 Out of sequence mining leading to ventilation complications  
 Location of workshop and critical spares availability 
These are really important issues to plan for, if the mechanised method is to be 
successful.  
The report stops short from unpacking the mining cycle complications of mixing a 
conventional support system with mechanised drilling loading.  
How do we ensure proper Equipment selection to enable an ideal mining 
cycle for the section? : It would be ideal if the OEMs had an off-the-shelf Roof 
bolting machine available as purchasing it would mean having an ideal suite of 
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equipment. But there is no off-the-shelf Roof bolter that matches the 1.9m 
stoping width, which is why this mine currently uses hand-held equipment. 
Millsell Mine  
 Millsell Mine forms part of Samancor’s western chrome mines. It exploits LG6 
and LG6A chromite ores using a room and pillar mining method. The ore 
body dips at average of 9° and 11° at most. The total reef width package is 
1.74m including internal waste making the environment ideal for 
mechanisation. Sections consist of 10 rooms (See Figure 2a for typical 
design specifications). The rooms are 14m in length with the stoping height 
varying between 1.74 and 1.8 m depending on local conditions. This is done 
to ensure that the mineable face length is adequate for equipment utilisation 
and to ensure that in the case of geological complications, production and 
productivity are maintained.  
The mining equipment includes the LP equipment for drilling and LHDs for 
loading ore, conveyor belts and utility vehicles. Handheld bolting is used to 
complement the mechanised fleet. No explanation was given as to why a 
mechanical bolter was not used. It might have been a matter of lack of capital 
outlay at the beginning of the project. The use of the existing equipment is 
effective, but the use of hand-held bolting was a concern.  
The majority of mechanised mining systems are motivated on the basis of 
improved safety, minimum human effort, improved production and higher 
efficiency. However, in most mines the author visited, hand-held bolters are 
used because the mechanical bolter was identified as a constraint. Hand-held 
crews were introduced as a measure to avoid production delays. 
In this case, the report started looking at underlying issues that may have led to 
use of hand-held Roof bolting machines.  
Was it capital availability, by design or removing the mechanical bolter as a 
constraint in the mining cycle? : According to the report, Millsell Mine had 
originally planned to use conventional hand-held bolting. Which mechanical 
bolter had high inefficiencies that led the mine’s Management to the conclusion a 
mechanical bolter would be a constraint?  
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Is there a bolter currently available from the OEMs with capability of mining 
at 1.9m or support in a 1.74 to 1.8m environment? : No, there isn’t. Because 
there is no off-the-shelf mechanised machine, and the fact that the mine’s 
conventional supporting was done as a parallel system which delivered the 
expected production per rig section, Management saw no need to partner with an 
OEM to develop a machine with that capability. 
Pickering’s 2010 workshop 
 At the 2010 workshop on Bord and Pillar best practice, Pickering explained 
that for a typical platinum hardrock room and pillar mine roof support is 
usually 1.5 to 1.6 metre resin grouted bolts with 4 to 6-metre-long cable 
anchors used at tips. With all the mines that presented at the workshop, four 
of the operations used low profile mechanised bolters for support installation. 
Three used auto rock drill units, to employ a combination of hand drilling and 
auto rock units, and one used hand-held drilling only.  
The paper carries on to unpack the fact that there is a certain Mine A in the 
Eastern Limb which mines platinum. The average production from a single 
drill rig section is 16 993 tons/month and with a maximum of production of 23 
700 tons/month. The mining cycle is three shifts per day for five days per 
week and one blast per day. What Pickering et al. (2010) does not state is 
why this highly efficient and successful mechanised mine, which uses auto 
rock units for roof support in its bords, uses a conventional support system? 
The author was privileged to be able to have an underground visit at Mine A. 
The details of the mine will be kept discreet as permission has not been 
granted to write technical facts on their behalf. What was observed at the 
mine during the visits are the following facts: 
 A rig section has 12 bords of 8m bord length. 
 Each drill rig section has two strike conveyor belts - one in the middle 
and the other at the last bottom bord of the section. 
 Bolting is done in parallel during the day shift; that is three bords are 
supported simultaneously. 
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 The triplets are left in the hanging wall and therefore the average 
stoping height is less than 2.1m. 
Pickering et al. (2010) further explains the bolting complexity facing the mines: 
the factors that need to be considered to determine the optimal Roof bolting 
strategy were initially thought to be a simple choice between mechanical bolters 
and the auto rock type of bolting. However, a complicating factor was the ever 
increasing need to install bolts that are longer than the stoping width. The 
individual issues identified were: 
 Operator exposure 
 The variability of the mining height 
 Support length and anchorage mechanism 
 Required bolting rate to match other activities 
 Bolting density and bolts required per face advance 
Operator safety was the overall dominating factor and it was concluded that the 
optimal solution was a mechanical cable bolter. It was decided that such a 
solution did not currently exist and that equipment manufacturers should be 
approached to develop a more efficient mechanised bolter installing longer bolts 
in narrower stoping width. 
This paper assertions, combined with my tacit knowledge, highlighted the 
following; provided that optimal numbers of bords are planned per drill rig section, 
the mine using Auto rock support units can still be highly productive, even 
surpass fully mechanised mines in terms of overall efficiencies.  
However, two main questions remain unanswered.  
First: If the stoping width varies below 2.1m is there a mechanical bolter with the 
capability to mine at this low end of the LP variable heights? 
Second: Do we have a machine capable of combining both the Roof bolting and 
installation of long cable anchors into a single activity? 
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Although one of my implementation members is currently dealing with a trial 
project to prove the second question, this will not be dealt with in this report as it 
not in the scope.  
2.2 The common challenge of Roof bolting and the reason for that 
In all four mine cases reviewed in sub-section 2.1, fundamental questions are 
looked at for a successful mechanised mining system implementation. I will 
further unpack these questions as they later lead to a more structured research 
theme/direction for the GHH bolter implementation at Merensky Shaft. 
 How do we address the questions arising from the four projects reviewed in 
sub-section 2.1? 
Proper planning for mechanised mine sections will have to take into account 
the impact of mining cycle planning per shift if it is to mix two different kinds of 
fleets. In the case of Saffy and Hossy shafts, both LP and XLP fleets were 
used to supplement each other. However, the LP bolting in the strike drives 
proved to be a constraint.  
At the Merensky Shaft, the GHH bolter and its accompanying fleet units will 
be used in the stoping section. In the development section, different OEMs 
machines will be used because of their capability at higher mining heights.  
 Has the planning taken into account the interacting variables from these two 
fleets? 
Remember, this led to the demise of the fully mechanised system at Saffy 
Shaft and eventually the whole of Lonmin. The challenge cannot be 
underestimated. 
 How do we ensure proper Equipment selection to enable an ideal mining 
cycle for the section? 
We need to plan for the optimal number of bords that match the selected 
machine capability. In addition, the bord length must fit within a certain 
number of bords which need to be supported per shift. The bolting rate and 
length of bolts have to be considered adequately if we are to meet the 
planned mining cycle per shift. 
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 Is there a bolter currently available from the OEMs with capability of mining at 
1.9m? 
No, but if there was could the Millsell Mine benefit from the OEMs trialling a 
bolter with 1.9m capability even though it is one of the most highly efficient 
mines in the hardrock category?  
 If the stoping width varies below 2.1m is there a mechanical bolter that has 
the capability to mine at this low end of the LP variable heights? 
Could Mine A, which is the second-best platinum producing mine, improve its 
production even more if it could have a mechanical bolter capable of 
supporting in a LP environment of stoping height less than 1,9m? Besides 
having a positive impact on mill head grade, such a machine could improve 
the mine’s ability to install cable anchors in areas where geological 
complications are encountered. 
To tackle the support complexity presented in Pickering et al. (2010), Mine A is 
also currently conducting trials using a cable anchor which combines both the 
functions of primary and secondary support. These trials are, however, still 
conducted using the auto rock unit to prove this new anchor innovation.  
Once this trial is completed perhaps Booysendal Mine will be in position to share 
the method of using a machine capable of combining these two functions. This is 
a potential area where full research can be done; to first look at the machine 
being trialled at Booysendal Mine and combine that research with the results of 
the new cable anchor at Mine A. 
2.3 Effect of stoping width on dilution 
Jordaan (2002) explains that dilution is a detrimental factor that can make any 
mining operation an unprofitable venture. Cost and revenue in any operation is 
determined per unit produced, and South African mining operations are costed in 
Rand per ton. When dilution increases, the mineral content per ton mined is 
reduced. Revenue is generated per fine ounce of mineral. The result is a 
reduction in revenue can reach a point where the mining costs and revenue 
created per ton are the same.  
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Dilution is a complicated issue. It is a function of the orebody’s dimensions and 
the machine operational dimensions; dip, and stoping width. If the dip is greater 
than that which the selected machines can handle efficiently, the orebody’s dip 
forces dilution to be designed into the layout. Flattening the footwall to the 
desired gradient does this. The minimum machine operating heights determines 
the minimum stoping width. 
Research by Nong (2010) seems to confirm the dilution challenges of 
mechanised mining. However, the research asserts the solution lies with the 
application of XLP machines. The next section of this research, 2.4, will examine 
the XLP progress to date.  
Nong (2010) states that in most cases waste is mined together with the 
mineralised zone, in the process diluting the in-situ grades. Dilution can take 
place as a result of mining activities, mine design process and poor waste 
management/control. It can be defined as ingress of waste material into the reef 
or mineralised rock during the mining operation. It impacts negatively on the mill 
head grade.  
Using mechanised equipment requires large excavations due to a number of 
factors. These include the sizes and movement on the reef planes. Nong (2010) 
further put forward XLP equipment as a solution, the extra-low profile machines 
are designed to operate in stoping widths less than 1.2m to minimise waste 
mining. As Nong states, the solution lies in XLP, so the question as to why mining 
operations are reluctant to adopt this technology can arise. 
Booysendal Merensky reef dips at 11° and varies in thickness mainly between 
75cm to 100cm. From the stratigraphic reef cut width information gathered and 
analysed by the Booysendal Mine Geology department, a larger proportion of the 
orebody lies between 75cm to 100cm. However, there’s still a significant part that 
averages around 150cm. Figures 2a and 2b clearly show that any mine design 
process stating the stoping height should be less than 1.2m will be fundamentally 
flawed as it would leave behind mineral reserves.  
The Booysendal Merensky Project team ran different scenarios and decided that 
the optimal stoping height for this shaft would be 1.9m as it still maximises value 
even though there’s an element of tolerable dilution planned into it (see Figure 
1c for the final Mining Cut that was agreed for the Merensky Shaft).  
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Now, the main challenge for a 1.9m stoping width is that there’s no off-the-shelf 
Roof bolting machine. The author fully unpacks the challenge of a fit-for-purpose 
machine for a stoping of 1.7 m to 1.9 m when reviewing the mine cases stated in 
section 2.1 of this research report. 
 
Figure 2e: Current SRC analysed from the surface boreholes  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
 
Figure 2f: Frequency of width distribution at the Merensky Shaft  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
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The challenge of mining at 1.7 to 1.9 m is threefold: 
(i) There will be a steep learning curve for the platinum mines as we will 
be using a bolter machine with which we have limited or shallow 
experience.  
(ii) If the machine is not ideal for the 1.9m environment we will have to 
work with OEMs to modify the machine to have the required 
capabilities. 
(iii) As stated in Pickering et al. (2010) we will have to partner with the 
OEMs to develop a machine that can combine two functions – that is, 
install resin bolts which are primary support and be capable of 
installing long cable anchors if the ground conditions warrant 
secondary support. 
See Figure 2g below for an ideal stoping width targeted at Booysendal Mine (the 
dilution factor in this design is within tolerable ranges accepted for the mine). 
 
Figure 2g: Planned Best Cut at the Merensky Shaft  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited)  
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2.4 Mechanising XLP bolting and lessons learned 
Comprehensive modelling work done by Fourie, Valicek, Krafft and Sevenoaks 
(2014) gives the fundamental parameters to be considered for mechanised mine 
design and planning. Although the work presented in Fourie et al. (2014) lays firm 
parameters, models and different scenarios to be considered for mechanised 
mining section, there are some design and operational flaws that need to be dealt 
with. 
 
Figure 2h: Physical mine design parameters considered and classification 
of mechanised mining methods  
(Source: Fourie et al. (2014)) 
35 
Table 1: Mechanised mining method’s physical specifications 
Table I 
Summary of stoping methods 
 LP XLP ULP 
Depth+ 0-400m 350-1800m 350-1800m 
Stoping Width 1.8-2m 1.3-1.7m 0.9-1.2m 
Mining Method Bord and pillar Breast mining Breast mining 
Dip ±10° 0°-22° 0°-22° 
Production 2100-3000m
2
 2100-3000m
2
 2000-4000m
2
 
Orebody Consistent ore 
deposits without 
major faults  
Consistent orebody, 
high extraction ratio 
Fairly consistent 
orebody, high 
extraction ratio 
Advantages Low Level operating 
complexity 
Less dilution when 
compared to LP 
Low wastage 
introduced into plant 
High-grade ore 
Able to deal with 
orebody complexities 
Disadvantages High volume tonnages 
Low Grade 
High operating cost 
Complex 
infrastructure 
Robust equipment 
Labour-intensive 
Highly skilled 
workforce 
Complex 
infrastructure 
Advanced technology 
Highly skilled 
workforce 
Technology in POC 
phase 
(Source: Fourie et al. (2014)) 
The technical paper seems to vary the stoping width interchangeably between 
different methods as if this variation is insignificant. On Figure 2b, the ULP 
method is said to operate between 0.7 to 1.2m and on Table 1 there’s 0.2m 
difference. In the context of the Merensky Shaft planned at Booysendal Mine, 
even a 0.15m variation on the planned stoping height will have a significant 
impact on the mill head grade, so we have to be absolutely clear on what the 
planned ranges are.  
Due to the use of 0.2m variation in between the methods, I will take the results 
derived from ULP-LP combination to apply equally to the XLP-LP combination. 
These results will be used to extract the learnings to be considered for 
Booysendal Merensky section. 
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Table 2: Simulated output of mixed mining layouts (XLP and LP fleet 
combined) 
Table III 
Stoping production tables 
Mining 
equipment 
Stope 
element 
Ht 
 
m 
Effective 
face 
length 
 
m 
Advance 
per blast 
 
m 
m2 per 
blast 
 
m2 
Mining 
rate 
 
m2/ 
month 
Panel 
face 
advance 
 
m 
Stoping 
system 
advance 
before 
geoloss 
 
m 
Total 
 
m2 
ASD 
development 
with LP 
equipment 
ASD 2.0 5.0 2.8 14.0 50.7 10.1 20.27 709 
Siding 1.0 1.5 2.8 4.2 15.2 10.1 20.27 182 
Total LP* 1.8 6.3 2.8 17.6 63.7 10.1 20.27 892 
Panel stoping 
with ULP 
equipment 
Panel 1.1 20.0 1.8 36.0 202.7 10.1 20.27 2 838 
Vent holing 1.1 2.2 1.8 4.0 22.5 10.1 20.27 270 
Total ULP* 1.1 21.9 1.8 39.4 222.0 10.1 20.27 3 108 
Total stope 
and gully 
(excl. RSE)*   
1.3 28.2 2.0 57.0 285.7 10.1 20.27 4 000 
*Weighted averages have been applied to this table in order to accommodate the two top panels not requiring any 
sidings or vent holings. 
Description Units ULP equipment LP equipment Total/average 
Effective face length m 21.9* 6.3* 28.2 
m2 per month m2 3 108 892 4 000 
Tons per month t 20 886 5 994 26 880 
Face advance m 1.80 2.80 2.02 
No. of blasts   79 51 70 
Tons per blast t 265 118 383 
Days per month   23 23 23 
Blasts per day   3.4 2.2 3.0 
Tons per day t 908 261 1 169 
m2 per day m2 135 39 174 
No.of faces   14 14 14 
Face advance m 10.1 10.1 10.1 
Blasts per face / month   5.6 3.6 5.0 
(Source: Fourie et al. (2014)) 
It’s clear from the planning that for a mechanised mining section to achieve its 
planned target the following must be specified: 
 Total number of Roof bolts to be drilled and installed per shift must be 
specified. In Fourie et al. (2014) it was specified that the total cycle time to 
drill 30 bolts (1.6m extension drilling) shall not exceed two hours. 
 The number of bords supported per shift must also be specified. In Fourie 
et al. (2014) it was specifically stated that two 20m panels shall be drilled 
in one shift. 
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 Range for stoping width must be clear so that all mining participants are 
aware. In Fourie et al. (2014) it was stated that for a ULP section, the 
range will be 0.9 to 1.2m. 
Fourie et al. (2014) modelling results in Table 2 applies a 0.833 confidence factor 
and states that the achievable production from the ULP-LP combined suites of 
equipment is 4 000m². The author was an Operational Manager for years at 
Union Mine Declines (Anglo American Platinum) where a hybrid mining method 
was used, so his view is that the above model, if put in practice, won’t yield the 
expected results (tacit, experiential knowledge). The constraint in a combination 
of the two processes as above won’t be the in-stope activities, but the strike 
drives development always tend to lag behind. The case above in Table 2 plans 
exactly the same advance in the panel and in the advance strike drive. From 
experience, the strike drive must always lead the panel by a minimum of at least 
9.0m for the system to work.  
In the above combination, the modelling does not take into account the 
interaction between the vehicles in the ASDs in case of breakdowns or when the 
machine needs to go in for a scheduled maintenance.  
Even though Fourie et al. (2014) did not take into account the full impact of the 
operational complexity of mixing the two processes, the mine design parameters 
and operational KPIs set out in this work will yield significant positive results if 
they are adhered to at Booysendal Merensky Shaft. 
38 
2.5 Why is bolting a bottleneck? 
 
Figure 2i: LP Equipment efficiency under varying ground conditions  
(Source: Valicek et al. (2012)) 
Experienced mine operators normally claim that Roof bolting is the bottleneck or 
constraint of all activities in the mechanised mining system. But when asked to 
explain why, very few can unpack the reason. Valicek et al. (2012) analysed the 
results presented in Figure 2i and came to the following conclusions: 
“The modelling found that if the current equipment availabilities and fleet 
configuration were taken into account, the following monthly production rates 
could be achieved per an LP team for A, B and S ground classification 
conditions: 
 Class A ground condition: a production rate of 2151 m²/month was 
achievable for a 9m panel length. 
 Class B ground condition: 1431m² /month was achievable for a 9m panel 
length. 
 Class S ground condition: 1236m² /month was achievable for a 6m panel. 
The study also found that, based on the geological mix of A, B and S ground in 
the observed section, an average of 1 714m² /month would be achieved in the 
bord and pillar section.” 
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The ground classification method at Booysendal Mine is the same as Anglo 
American Platinum Mines. The categorisation is the same, only the naming 
differs. 
According to Valicek, Fourie, Krafft and Sevenoaks (2012):  
Class A means normal ground conditions in which no undue rock fall risk is 
posed.  
Class B and S are areas where there is an increased risk of rock falls and which 
require additional support and mining strategies over and above the normal 
standards.  
Booysendal’s normal conditions are named TARP1 (i.e. Trigger Action Response 
Plan), TARP2 and TARP 3. The latter two are complex ground conditions where 
interventions of geotechnical personnel are required. In most cases, they end up 
recommending the installation of long cable anchors to supplement the resin 
bolts. 
The author can confirm that the modelling conducted by Valicek et al. (2012) is 
100% accurate. At Booysendal Mine, Johan Schoombee, a Mine Overseer in the 
LP part of the UG2 is a consistent top performer in terms of m²/month and 
tons/drill rig section. He was affected by TARP3 ground for over two months and 
the section production dropped from the range of 2 000m² to 1 250m² /month. 
When the ground conditions normalised, this section returned to levels of 1 850 – 
2 000 m².  
Valicek et al. (2012) explains the drop in production as directly attributed to the 
bolter performance: “It can be seen in Figure 2i that when the ground conditions 
change from the favourable Class A to less favourable B and S ground 
conditions, the LP Roof bolter (RB) becomes the critical machine within the 
mining cycle.” 
2.6 Effect of bolting on Mining cycle 
Hattingh, Sheer and du Plessis (2010) explain the following implementation 
dynamics regarding mechanisation: Lonmin has reported several issues with its 
implementation projects ranging from equipment and supplier issues to human 
factors related specifically to the determination of appropriate cycle and standard 
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times, learning curves, training, change management and the setting of realistic 
production targets.  
According to Harrison, cited in Hattingh et al. (2010) the aim of Anglo Platinum’s 
mechanisation strategy is to improve safety by removing the Operators from the 
face and to increase labour productivity and operational efficiency. Completion of 
the production cycle is critical and daily supervision and discipline are necessary 
to ensure the mining cycle is completed within the planned time.  
Research by Strong, Terblanche, Gohre and Andrews (2006) points to a 
critical trap that mines using mechanised equipment should not fall into.  
When mining operations introduce mechanised equipment, they continue to think 
on a consecutive basis and operate around conventional mining processes – 
drilling, bolting, loading, and tramming are viewed as separate cycles and not as 
fully integrated processes in the underground mining system.   
Strong et al. (2006) further explains that for mechanised mining to be successful 
– drilling, bolting, loading, and tramming activities should be occurring 
underground all the time to make capital assets sweat. For this to happen there 
first has to be a holistically-planned total cycle where the KPIs of each individual 
machine and its mini-cycle are factored into the total time taken to complete the 
full cycle of loading, bolting, drilling, charging up and blasting.  
To simplify the concept of the holistic cycle, Strong et al. (2006) asserts that at 
any one time there should be an end being drilled, another being loaded, an end 
being supported, and yet another end being charged so that the planned ends 
are ready for blasting.  
This eliminates costly machines standing idle. Because the interaction between 
the cycles is so interdependent, if the end has not been prepared at the planned 
time the machines cannot be operated.  
Clearly, for the GHH Roof bolter project, how long it takes to completely install a 
single bolt, how long it takes to install seven Roof bolts required in a single line 
as per Booysendal Mine standard and how long it takes to complete a single 
bord/end’s support needs to be clear. Both Hattingh and Strong highlight the 
need to plan the whole production cycle in its entirety. But if one is not sure what 
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to expect from the bolting cycle, the drill rig machines will stand idle having no 
ends to drill.  
Since the GHH Roof bolter is completely new to the Booysendal Mine 
environment, neither the Management nor the Operators have experience on its 
performance, so predictions on its impact on the mining cycle cannot be made or 
even properly planned.  
A simple, well planned trial is necessary to determine the equipment’s 
capabilities and then an appropriate target for its own mini-cycle needs to be set. 
According to Valicek, Krafft, Strydom and Fourie (2014) it is inevitable that there 
will be time lost while executing a task if machines are being used. If so, then 
areas prone to lost time are: 
 At the start and end of shifts 
 Between activities 
 Time to report and repair breakdowns 
 The reaction time to re-schedule due to breakdown 
 The time to identify and then rectify the sub-standard activities 
Time study exercises and observations were done during this research to 
understand and set standard times for:  
 Bolter machine set-up  
 Installing bolts 
 Disconnecting the machine 
 Moving out of the face 
 Travel to the next face and repeating the process again from set up. (See 
sub-section 4.5 for the time-and-motion study results obtained in this 
research).  
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Time to repair the machine and re-scheduling after breakdowns is out of 
scope of this research, as we must first prove the GHH Roof bolter (3108a 
ADE) can efficiently support ends within the expected time frames. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has unpacked critical knowledge as to the underlying rationale of 
why the mines currently mining at stoping heights less 1.9m are still using either 
conventional hand-held bolting or auto rocks. Through published literature, the 
author was able to gain insights into what was achieved in the four hard rock 
mines where the stoping width is ranging between 1.75m to 1.9m.  
The chapter also highlighted the common challenges that are associated with 
mechanised equipment Roll-out. Although a range of issues were dealt with, the 
two most prevalent ones are dilution control and cycle completion. Dilution and 
cycle are two most important parameters that directly influence each other in a 
mining section. 
The effect of uncontrolled dilution in a mining project means less metal will be 
recovered than the planned target. This will have a negative effect on the project 
viability. A machine that can consistently operate within the specified bord 
dimensions is therefore critical for the project’s financial viability. Once the 
machine fits into the bord dimensions, it then needs to deliver the expected 
output within the tolerable range of the standard times.  
A blasted bord/end that is diluted, due to over breaking, will increase the bord 
loading time. The support also may require additional bolts due to increased bord 
length. The drilling of the bord may take longer due to the several machine set-
ups that may be required.  
In Chapter 3, the author will explain what was done during the trial stage to 
perform to the expected bolting rates per shift and give the results. 
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3. FROM TRIAL TO FINAL MODIFIED MACHINE 
3.1 Trial background 
This chapter aims at providing an understanding of the original machine (the ADE 
3108) trialled at the Merensky Shaft from June 2016 to December 2016.  
First, the chapter looks at the basic machine design specifications by introducing 
the machine as is, the aim of the trial, and the operational gaps it meant to 
address; mainly coming from the learnings of the four mines reviewed in Chapter 
2. Then, a typical fleet working as a suite with the ADE bolter is briefly explained.  
The thrust of this chapter is, after introducing the machine, is to unpack the 
preliminary trial stage time study results, and finally, state the research questions 
the author aims to address in Chapters 4 and 5. The research questions will 
primarily be aimed at addressing the use of industrial engineering techniques to 
validate the suitability of the improvement approach employed in this case study. 
The industrial engineering techniques will also test the appropriateness of 
implementation KPIs adopted for this case study. 
3.1.1 Bolter Definition 
GHH Mining Machines offered the mine the ADE 3108 Roof bolter for trial that 
along with certified set operational and safety parameters, was also capable of 
mining in stoping widths as low as 1,7m. The suggested pricing of the unit was 
hugely competitive and indicated an operating cost that was attractive in a 
reduced cost environment.   
In addition, the following capabilities listed were advantageous for the mine: 
(i) A safe position for the Operator in a bolting operation. 
(ii) Limited disturbance of surrounding rock due to operational drill 
hammering. 
(iii) Reduction in operational noise levels due to the application of rotary 
drilling operation. 
(iv) Light weight and operationally simplistic drill consumables. 
(v) Capability to install long anchors. 
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(vi) Bolting unit operational flexibility. 
If the capabilities in the previous paragraph proved to be correct what did 
Booysendal Mine want to achieve by using the Roof bolter at the Merensky Shaft 
and what were the Key Performance Indicators the Mine looking for? 
The objective is to produce 1 900m² at 235m system face advance per 
month in stoping to yield 11 500 tons per rig section at a defined stoping 
width of 1 900mm. 
To achieve the desired output, the 3108 ADE bolter must perform as per the 
following KPIs: 
(v) Drill and install a 1.75m resin applied rock bolt in 8 mins. 
(vi) Bolt installation times, including movement between bords, should be 
in the region of 2 hrs allowing for the flexibility of supporting 3 bords in 
the available 7 hrs face time. 
(vii) For 3 bords to be completely supported, the Roof bolter must install 
42 bolts per shift. 
(viii) The bolter must be able to install bolts in stoping widths ranging from 
1700 to 2000 mm to achieve the defined stoping width of 1900 mm. 
At the Booysendal Mine trial from June 2016 – Dec 2016, the bolter did not 
consistently achieve its KPIs. The objective of this research is to optimise the 
operation of the bolter so that it can meet the KPIs it has on other mines. 
The ADE 3108 has the capabilities (i – iv) listed on page 43 and they were 
proven to be accurate during the trial stage. It must be noted that Booysendal 
Mine required that the capabilities (v – vi) also need to be proven. But, bear in 
mind, Merensky Shaft was not in the financial year 2016 Business Plan, so there 
was less pressure to optimise productivity.  
It’s worth noting that the GHH trainers were training the site bolter Operators 
concurrently with production outputs enabling these Operators to not only 
become relatively competent in the operation of the bolter but also to learn to 
adapt to the required behaviour in the mechanised environment. It also allowed 
much needed time for any modification necessary to be done on the machine 
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without having the immense operational pressure that, being in the 2016 
Business Plan, the UG2 bolter Operators were having.  
When modifications are done, does the machine consistently deliver 235m 
system advance and consistently achieves three bords (42 bolts) supported per 
shift? 
 
 
 
Figure 3a: Unmodified 3108 ADE bolter and its technical drawings  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
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3.2 SLP concept and ADE bolter applications 
Figure 3a shows the original, unmodified GHH Roof bolter 3108 ADE delivered 
to Booysendal Mine at the end of May 2016 along with its technical drawings 
showing the machine dimensions.  
When the unit was delivered, the OEM brochure claimed that this trackless 
mobile bolting unit was capable of bolting in reefs at 1.7m, and ultimately at 
stoping widths of 1.9m when taking the over breaks into account. The OEM 
further claimed the 3108 ADE had maximum protection measures to ensure a 
safe environment for the Operator. These claims were validated by the MSHA 
certification issued by structural engineers for the canopy loading capability. The 
3108 ADE canopy and its supporting structures (boom, chassis and turret 
frames) have been proven to take a total load of 12.4tons.  
3.3 Project Management and trial stage time study results 
3.3.1 Management factors 
The Project was managed by independent consultants who applied sound 
industrial engineering principles under constant mine Management supervision. 
Through short interval meetings between the project team and Management, we 
agreed the below mentioned items were to be addressed and then we would take 
a decision on whether we would purchase the machine as is, or do modifications 
prior to taking final commercial decisions. 
a) Trials to improve installation effectiveness: 
 With different GHH observers, we tested different diameter rock bolts, 
rock bolt lengths and diameters as can be seen in Table 3. 
 Resin capsule sizing and composition – the trial started with 30cm 
capsules and different tests were done until we settled on a combination 
of 0.5m and 0.7m capsules. 
 Brow angle support installation – we assessed the capability of the 3108 
ADE without the fore and aft tilt.  
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 Camera holes – we drilled the 4.0m long holes and tested different 
combinations of drill rods. We also did a time study to determine how long 
it took. See Table 3 for the results. 
 Long anchors with regard to length and diameter alternatives – we ran 
different tests, at the time of writing this report we still had residual issues 
in that the last drill rods of the four was getting stuck in the hole when 
completing the 4.0m. 
 Operator ergonomics with regard to bord down-dip(sometimes referred to 
as low wall side) bolt installation – we realised we need a bracket to push 
up the bolt face plate with less physical effort from the Operator.  
b) Bolter effectiveness advancement scope: 
 Improved bolt installation capability – two versus three bords in a 7 hr 
face cycle time. When we changed the rods from three combinations to 
two we started achieving three supported bords more often. 
 Complete bolt installation matrix differentiation – a complete matrix looks 
at the ideal combination of number of rods, resin capsule sizes, diameter 
of bits and diameter of rods. 
 Improved bolter drill head flexibility and Operator ergonomics – we looked 
at the boom sump, turret tilting angles and Operator comfort when 
installing Roof bolts on the low wall side of the bord.  
c) Bolter structural adaptions: 
 Adaptions to bolter design as per learnings from its application (Sub-
section 3.4 of the report to explain all the modifications in detail). 
d) Operational Management implementation principles: 
 Formal systems were put in place to ensure the safe and effective 
transformation from ‘trial and error’ project norms to a Structured Change 
Management process which was adhered to and initiated as per the A3 
process in Chapter 4. 
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It must be stated here that although Change management and Implementation 
rules were well-documented when it came to physical on-the-ground 
implementation, it turned out to be more difficult and complex than it was initially 
thought.  
In Chapter 4, the author will unpack the complexities the implementation team 
were faced with because of the A3 process findings and specifications also the 
actions taken. 
The Roof bolter effectiveness-enhancing modifications done by the Engineers, 
although trivial, had immense impact issues as they weren’t communicated back 
to the Roof bolter Operators. Now a situation arose where the Operator thought 
he or she wasn’t listened to because his or her inputs were not being considered, 
and the Engineer was wondering why his modifications does not enhance 
performance. Both the Operator and the Engineers were expecting certain 
outcomes, but there was no interface planned for sharing their experiences and 
expectations.  
If not handled well, this implementation dilemma had the potential to render the 
project a failure; not due to machine or Operator capability, but due to lack of a 
Change management ‘bridge’ between the two. This research will deal with this 
issue in depth in Chapter 4. 
Deon Miles from GHH observed and recorded a total of 83 installed bolts. In each 
case he recorded the rig set up time, the bolt drilling time and the bolt installation 
time. Calculations were then done to quantify the total time for bolting, number of 
bits used per bolt, bolts installed per hour and the drill rod penetration rate whilst 
drilling. (Refer to Table 3 to see results of observations compiled by Deon Miles). 
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Electrical power vs Diesel 
The 3108 ADE can be operated either through an electrical power supply or in 
the diesel mode. Various tests using two bit makes and sizes – 35mm and 25mm 
drill bits were done.  
Drill rods from Normeco (Bits Supplier) were used. Both the threaded R23 drill 
stems and the stackable hex rods were trialled and tested.  
The bits and the rods from Kennametal were also used. Table 3 gives the base-
case times for the best and average installation times achieved.
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Table 3: Summary of time study results of 3108 ADE bolter sometimes referred to as African Bolter 
African Bolter - Data Recorded 
  Rotary Drilling - 35mm bits Rotary - 25mm bits 
  
Deon - Kenna 
(Diesel) 
Gert - Normeco 
(Diesel) 
Gert - Kenna 
(Diesel) 
Gert - Kenna 
(Electric) 
Gert - Normeco 
(Electric) 
Camera Holes 
Normeco - 25mm - 
60 secs 
  Best Average Best Average Best Average Best Average Best Average Best Average Best Average 
No of Bolts 83 74 29 20 69 12 75 
Bolt installation (mins): 
                            
Rig set up 1.13 1.92 0.79 1.23 0.77 1.29 0.91 1.27 1.38 1.88 1.08 1.25 0.78 1.28 
Rock bolt hole drilling (1.8m) 4.85 5.76 4.81 6.03 6.93 7.70 6.91 7.78 5.37 6.62 10.87 11.45 3.61 4.63 
Resin bolt installation 1.53 2.64 2.41 2.57 2.25 2.51 2.59 3.93 2.47 2.69 Camera facility only 1.98 2.23 
Total time for bolting 7.50 10.32 8.01 9.83 9.95 11.51 10.41 12.97 9.22 11.19 11.95 12.70 6.36 8.14 
Bolts per bit 1.0 0.6 3.0 2.1 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.5 3.0 2.0     3.0 2.9 
Bolts per hour 8.0 5.8 7.5 6.1 6.0 5.2 5.8 4.6 6.5 5.4     9.5 7.4 
Penetration Rate (mins/m) 2.7 3.2 2.7 3.4 3.8 4.3 3.8 4.3 3.0 3.7     2.0 2.6 
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited, Implementation team records) 
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3.3.2 Technical factors 
Leading factors influencing variants considered in bolting configurations using the 
3108 ADE (sometimes referred to as African Bolter by the OEM Engineers) at 
Booysendal Merensky Shaft operations:  
 Rotary drilling and bolting application  
 Stackable hex tube drill stem 
 Increased drill penetration rates 
 Reduced hole diameter and subsequent efficiency effects - Smaller 
diameter drill stem system 
 Bit size 
 Lesser diameter Roof bolt 
 Lesser resin volume  
 Acceptable hanging wall support parameters 
In summary – the crux of the exercise was to decrease the support time of the 
bord ensuring adherence to the envisaged ‘3 bords a shift’ cycle and optimising 
the Mechanised SLP Fleet to its potential.  
In Table 3, the first four sets of results were obtained using a Kennametal drill 
string together with a 35mm drill bit. An 18mm hole diameter was achieved at 
different times when drilling with a 25mm drill bit.  
The time studies were done by different observers and the machine was either 
operated in the electric or diesel mode. The best time achieved was 7.5 minutes 
for total bolt installation, while the worst average time was 12.97 minutes.  
While the number of bolts ranged from 4.6 to 8 bolts installed per hour, for the 
machine to achieve the expected operational performance it needs to 
consistently install a minimum of 6 bolts per hour. This equates to 42 bolts in 7.5 
hours available shift time. A single bord requires 14 bolts of two rows of 7 bolts to 
support a 3.0 m advanced face per blast.  
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Using the same 25mm diameter drill string but a different make - Normeco 
instead of Kennametal - improved the results significantly; from best achieved of 
7.5 to 6.36 minutes and the average from 12.97 to 8.14 minutes (See the last two 
columns of Table 3).  
The question that arises in such a situation is this; is the improvement due the 
change of drill string make or a different Operator or a change of operating 
modes from diesel to electric? Only in-depth study consisting of physical 
observations and time recording can really give an appropriate rationale for the 
above results.  
Before each blast at Booysendal Mine, a 4.0 metres long camera hole is drilled 
into the hanging wall to observe the hanging wall conditions and the status of the 
geological features. Camera holes drilling times and effectiveness of the 3108 
ADE bolter to achieve this, is not in the scope of this research. However, it must 
be noted that although the camera hole is twice the length of a support hole, the 
time to drill these was achieved with times frames of between 11.95 to 12.70 
minutes. (See the 3rd and 4th last columns of Table 3). 
Table 4: Operational performance achieved (ADE 3108 Roof bolter)  
African Bolter - Rock Bolting Performance 
  Best Average Comments 
Time to drill 1.75m rock bolt hole 3.63 mins 4.94 mins Normeco bit 
Time to drill and install bolt 6.37 mins 8.71 mins   
Time to complete panel bolts (2.8m 
advance) 
2hr36mins 
  
No. of panels completed per 8hr 
shift 
3+ Back 
support 
3+ Back 
support 
  
Time to drill camera hole (4.0m) 11.67 mins 12.40 mins 
No times with 
XX bit 
Time to drill anchor holes (4.0m) Await performance   
Noise levels at bolter head 
Noise levels 1 metre from source 
Noise levels 5 metre from source 
Noise levels 10 metre from source 
95.9dBA 
93.3dBA 
90.0dBA 
88.8dBA   
Bolter availability 90%   
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited, Implementation team records) 
As the Operators and the GHH trainers were getting to know each other better, 
they also started to understand the expected shift output for this 3108 ADE 
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bolter. The best achieved times improved to consistently repeat the performance 
of 6.37 minutes per bolts, although not all Operators achieved it. The average 
times started to be consistently 8.71 minutes.  
At this stage of the trial, the author did not want to focus on Operator capability or 
Operator proficiency before he fully understood the machine itself and had 
ensured all modifications requested by Operators were done.  
The next subsections of the report will deal with the modifications that were done. 
They will also thoroughly scrutinise other industry research papers to understand 
if they did similar work or are there any other modifications we are not 
addressing. Only when the modifications and the industry gaps have been fully 
understood will the author deal with Operator effectiveness and proficiency in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
3.4 Modifications done as a result of the trial  
While doing the 3108 ADE time studies, and during physical observations by 
various stakeholders (the implementation team, Mine General Manager and Mine 
Supervisors), a number of recurring problems led to the modifications explained 
in sub-section 3.4.1  
Prevalent problems were: 
(i) Operator ergonomics while installing Roof bolts in the low wall side of 
the bord – the Operator had to be in a squatting position whilst 
inserting the bolt in a drilled hole. Besides being uncomfortable to the 
Operator, this also exposed him/her to the unsupported area. 
(ii) A limited boom sump required numerous rig set ups over the target 
hanging wall grid marks to drill holes on the positions marked off by 
the miner. 
(iii) The ability of the 3108 ADE to negotiate tight turning corners when 
moving through in-situ 7.0m by 7.0m pillars left for support. 
(iv) The ability of the turret to tilt at different angles to support overhanging 
rocks left in the corner of pillars and also to install as close as 50cm 
from the sidewall. 
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The modifications were aimed at addressing the above problems and at the 
same time accelerate the drilling and the installation times. 
3.4.1 Booysendal Initiated Bolter Unit Adaptions  
The following requested and approved adaptions to further enhance safety 
and efficiency have been implemented on the bolting unit, now known as 
the 3108a ADE bolter:    
a) A similar compact carrier and drill boom configuration with added 
head unit safety and operational applications at a hugely competitive 
capital outlay. Figure 3b shows the ‘man on the platform boom’ with 
a stool provided for the Operator. The operating controls and the 
accessories loading tray were positioned right in front of the Operator 
for easy reach. 
 
Figure 3b: Operator drilling compartment with low wall side ergonomics 
taken into account  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
b) Similar manoeuvrability due to short boom configuration coupled with 
a tight turning radius and a reduced boom oscillation while travelling. 
The overall length of the machine was increased by 859mm, from 9 
279mm to 10 138 mm. The boom sump was extended by 407mm and 
the boom was also modified to be able to swing a maximum of 42º on 
either left or right-hand side from the centre line. (See Figures 3c 
and 3d for the exact dimensions). 
55 
 
Figure 3c: Turning radius – important for bords negotiation in room and 
pillar method  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
The unit tramming and operational height (See Figure 3d for maximum 
machine height of 1 400mm) is still compatible to the SLP mining concept 
with regard to the installation of hanging wall support in stoping widths as 
low as 1.7 metres. But, the limitation with the modification is that if 
geological features are encountered and the mining height increases 
above 3.5m, then this bolter will not be able to install support at that 
height. 
 
 
Figure 3d: Unit height – important for bords negotiation in room and pillar 
method  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
c) The boom now lifts, swings and extends to allow for a 4 000mm 
straight line bolt installation from one chassis position. The fore and 
aft tilt capabilities of the rotary drill unit, combined with a vertical 
extendable footwall facility, enables not only ‘angle bolting’ but also 
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allows for bolting up to heights of 2.6 metres. The configuration also 
addresses the bolt installation within 50cm from the rock face. (See 
Figure 3e for fore and aft tilt in different directions combined with new 
boom swings). 
 
Figure 3e: Fore and aft tilt capabilities of the drill unit  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
d) Drilling boom vertical flexibility not only assists in higher operational 
reach but also provides the ability to negotiate stepped footwall 
mining conditions. (See Figure 3f for the 10º capability for boom lift 
and lowering). 
 
Figure 3f: Drilling boom movements  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
e) Drilling, resin insertion and bolting are accomplished from under the 
TRS canopy (Temporary Roof Support – Figure 3g) allowing for the 
maximum efficiency and safety.  Bolter operating controls are now 
single-sided with an extended canopy protection and an added 
vertical bar support, complete with an operating stool for Operator 
comfort. 
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Figure 3g: Operator comfort considered in TRS canopy design  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
f) When drilling the 38mm long anchor holes, an increase of thrust is 
required to effectively drill the larger diameter hole. To achieve this, 
Fletcher (GHH partner for 3108 ADE design and manufacture) has 
introduced the addition of a valve which, when activated, will increase 
the thrust.  
We started in June 2016 with Machine A (Original 3108 ADE bolter), and with all 
the adaptations and the modifications done, as per request from Operators and 
from Engineer’s observations, moved to Machine B (Upgraded to 3108a ADE 
bolter): See Figure 3h. 
58 
 
Figure 3h: Upgrading from a 3108 to a 3108a machine 
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
3.4.2 Lonmin and Anglo Platinum Initiated Bolter Unit Adaptions  
According to Webber, van den Berg, Le Roux and Hudson (2010), lessons 
learned from the mechanisation in Lonmin pointed to the following issues: 
 The XLP equipment delivered lower efficiencies than expected. 
 The XLP equipment could not effectively deal with geological anomalies, 
especially on the western side of Lonmin’s operations. 
 The interdependency of machines in an XLP cycle meant reliability issues 
were compounded. 
 The excessive reef development caused high dilution to the head grade. 
Larger development ends were blasted to accommodate the mechanised 
equipment. Excessive stoping widths were caused by the inability of the 
XLP equipment to deal with rolls in the reef. 
Machine A 
Machine B 
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While there were other important lessons learned by Webber et al. (2010), the 
author was really drawn to the fact that the research identified the importance of 
mining cycle completion and the interdependencies of activities to achieve 
planned production targets.  
Table 5 below shows the KPIs set by Lonmin team to achieve their target. It is 
important to understand they were actually setting industry 
standards/benchmarks with regard to mining cycles. 
Table 5: Lonmin’s XLP Performance KPIs  
LP face rig 
  
Panel 
length 
Holes 
Drilling 
cycle 
time 
Holes 
per 
hour 
Travelling and 
set-up time 
Total 
cycle time 
KPIs 26.5m 156 4.3h 36 45min 5.1h 
XLP Bolter 
  
Panel 
length 
Holes 
Bolting 
cycle 
time 
Bolts 
per 
hour 
Travelling and 
set-up time 
Total 
cycle time 
KPIs  
(resin bolts) 
26.5m 32 4.5h 7 45min 5.3h 
KPIs  
(resin bolts) 
26.5m 32 2.9h 11 45min 3.7h 
XLP dozer 
  
Panel 
length 
Tonnes 
for 
dozer 
cleaning 
Cleaning 
cycle 
time 
Tonnes 
per 
hour 
Travelling and 
set-up time 
Total 
cycle time 
KPIs 26.5m 122.4 2.8 44 30min 3.3h 
(Source:  Webber et al. (2010)) 
According to Webber et al. (2010), the XLP bolter utilises a single boom to drill 
and install 1.6m split resin bolts. Roof bolts are installed on a spacing of 1m (dip) 
by 1.5m (strike). It must be noted this is exactly the same pattern Booysendal 
Merensky Shaft installs its 1.8m resin bolts.  
Webber et al. (2010) further states that according to Table 5, the XLP bolter has 
a total cycle of 5 hours and 20 minutes. So, the XLP can complete the support of 
a 26.5m panel length (installing 32 resin bolts) in less than a shift.  
The bolter’s cycle time of 5 hours 20 minutes currently represents the longest 
cycle time in the fleet of equipment, and options of separating the drilling of 
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support holes and installation of Roof bolts are under investigation. The actual 
results from Lonmin show the consistent installation of 6 bolts per hour which is 
similar to Anglo Platinum Bathopele Mine’s 23 bolts in 4.1 hours.  
While it is worth investigating separating drilling from installing bolts, the current 
record of industry gravity-induced fall of ground fatalities means we will face stiff 
resistance from safety regulators to implement these initiatives.  
Although drilling of Roof bolts and installation of bolts are two separate 
operations, they are closely interlinked. For instance, in all the mines I’ve worked 
at, the Roof bolter drills the hole, the Roof bolt is then installed and tensioned 
before the Operator moves to the next hole.  
The rock in the hanging wall is not homogeneous, so the Rock Engineers specify 
the first area drilled needs to be fully supported before drilling the next hole. And 
for good reason; failure to adhere to this leads to fall of ground fatalities. Drilling a 
whole row of Roof bolt holes first and installing the Roof bolts later, in a follow-
behind operation, will face stiff resistance from the Rock Engineers and the 
safety regulators. 
Why has the industry not looked for ways of improving from 6 to 7 bolts per hour 
and optimising the whole system to ensure the mining cycle is completed within a 
shift since 2010?  
The author examined extensive work done by M. Andrews and R.G.B. Pickering 
at Bathopele Mine with regard to machine adaptations and the effects of those 
adaptations/modifications.  
According to Andrews and Pickering (2010), previous trials completed at Anglo 
Platinum Bathopele Mine and Lonmin identified the performance of the XLP Roof 
bolter as the primary system bottleneck. Andrews et al. (2010) further asserted 
the XLP fleet application had been found to be successful. The cost benefits 
significantly outweigh those of standard low profile mining methods because of 
the substantial reductions in waste dilution.  
Although Booysendal Mine is not implementing the XLP fleet, the author learned 
from the trial methodology applied by Andrews and Pickering (2010) how to 
assess the performance of the Roof bolter and address the trial’s challenges. 
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Andrews and Pickering (2010) state that in terms of XLP mining, the mining 
system constraints can be identified and mitigated by ensuring, Goldratt’s Theory 
of Constraints (2004) is applied to all activities associated within the XLP mining 
cycle. This would address system bottlenecks which will have a direct influence 
on both machine and subsequent mine output.  
According to Goldratt (2004), five focusing steps should be adopted to address 
such a system, defined as: 
 Identify the constraint (the resource or policy that prevents the organisation 
from obtaining more of the goal). 
 Decide how to exploit the constraint (make sure the constraint’s time is not 
wasted doing things that it should not do). 
 Subordinate all other processes to the above decision (align the whole 
system or organisation to support the decision made above). 
 Elevate the constraint (if required or possible, permanently increase the 
capacity of the constraint; ‘buy more’) 
 If, as a result of these steps, the constraint has moved, return to step 1. 
A detailed time and motion study at Anglo Platinum Bathopele Mine was 
conducted by Sandvik Trans4mine team looking at the XLP bolter with a 
system’s operations perspective. Andrews and Pickering (2010) state that issues 
and identified solutions associated with optimising each of the tasks in XLP bolter 
were analysed and summarised as below: 
 The rod coupling procedure was cumbersome and time-consuming, 
contributing 21% additional time to that associated with a standard non-
coupled bolt. Time was required to couple and screw the threaded R23 
rods together, prior to relocating the drill string on the drifter and raising the 
feed back into the hole. This is a manual process, thereby compromising 
Operator/assistant safety (the assistant runs the risk of injury when 
coupling the bolt and is in the vicinity of potential rock falls during the 
process). 
 The need to use four rods to attain 1.6m bolt hole length poses the same 
safety and time constraints as those discussed above with the coupling 
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process. Any possibility of reducing the coupling requirements would 
substantially improve the cycle and reduce the potential of personnel injury 
or harm. In the case of Booysendal Mine trial, we started the process with 
four rods to achieve a hole length of 1.75 metres and we ran different tests 
until three ideal couplings were used to achieve the required 1.75m hole. 
 Due to the nature of the tramming system at Bathopele Mine, positioning 
the machine directly over the target where the bolt is supposed to be 
installed, is difficult to achieve. Tramming currently lacks proportionality, 
which makes the machine movement relatively ‘jerky’ and it becomes 
difficult to carry out the required levels of accuracy. 
 The bolt installation process is completely dependent on the XLP Roof 
bolter due to the added requirement of inserting, spinning, and securing the 
bolt. The force needed with resin bolts requires mechanical assistance to 
perform these functions. The injection and installation process therefore 
reduces the machine’s capacity to drill by 36%. 
Andrews and Pickering (2010) implemented the following initiatives to address 
the identified issues: 
 Drilling optimisation: A new XLP Roof bolter with a longer stroke was 
designed, ensuring three rods could achieve the desired 1.6m hole length 
instead of four. Booysendal Mine did numerous tests using rods with 
different coupling mechanisms ranging from the screw type to stackable 
hex systems, and eventually also came up with an ideal three rods 
combination.  
At Booysendal Mine, we went further with the optimisation. We tested the 
combination of two rods of 0.9 and 1.2m and found it ideal for drilling 1.8m 
support holes, considering the 21cm that goes in the drifter chuck.  
In the case of Andrews and Pickering (2010), the revised design resulted in 
a drilling time of 27 seconds per bolt (19%) and a 6% improvement in 
overall bolt cycle time. Incidentally, the feed was also modified from a chain 
to a rope-cylinder feed which, to date, has yielded a 50% improvement in 
reliability. 
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 Bolt installation optimisation: A decision was taken to attempt to ‘de-
couple’ the drilling of the bolt from the installation of the bolt. After 
considering several possibilities, the selected solution was the New 
Concept Mining’s Hydrabolt - a type of friction bolt which encapsulates 
water. The bolt is manually installed using a separate water pump and can 
be carried out after the XLP Roof bolter has completed drilling the hole, 
allowing the XLP machine to proceed to the next hole and start drilling 
whilst the previous hole’s bolt is installed.  
Although the implementation of the Hydrabolt does not necessarily optimise 
the number of personnel at the face, it was viewed as an interim solution, 
while a mechanised solution was being developed.  
Implementation of the Hydrabolt resulted in a reduction in overall XLP Roof 
bolter cycle time of 156 per bolt (35% improvement in bolt cycle time). At 
Booysendal Mine, due to presence of serpentinite infills and sometimes 
separated chrome stringers in the Merensky Reef’s hanging wall, a 
‘decoupling” option was not looked at. In fact, we looked at installing both 
resin bolts and cable anchors concurrently. 
 Rod coupling optimisation: To reduce the coupling time associated with 
the extension drilling process, a newly designed drill rod and couplings 
were developed. They were called the Infinity range because of their figure 
eight coupling shape. A shape that was relatively easy to manufacture, and 
far easier to couple during the drilling process of the bolt.  
The introduction of this steel resulted in a 61second improvement in overall 
cycle time per bolt, representing an overall improvement of 13% to the bolt 
cycle time.  
At Booysendal, we realised the R23 threaded drill stems are not ideal, 
which is why we changed to the stackable hex system. This system is quick 
and easy to couple. An added advantage is that it reduces the probability of 
finger injuries. 
 Machine/boom movement optimisation: To accurately and efficiently 
position the machine under the required hole, proportional tramming was 
developed, allowing precise locating of the machine over the bolt hole with 
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minimal effort. This is currently being tested at Anglo Platinum Bathopele 
Mine. Provisional results show an overall improvement of 10 seconds per 
bolt (2% improvement in overall cycle time).  
During the trial at Booysendal Mine, the Operators gave numerous useful 
suggestions on how to best position the turret over ‘target hole’ to be 
drilled. Some thought a robust on-board camera to show grid positions, 
others a laser grid like the one used on Fletcher machines in coal mines, 
and other Operators requested we relook the Standard Operating 
procedure of marking off both support grids at once so that they could 
install both bolts sequentially on strike rather than on dip.  
All the four initiatives were incorporated in the 3108a modified machine and a 
new base time for overall bolt cycle time was then determined. 
3.5 Research question(s) 
As per the coaching from Professor F. Cawood (personal communication, 
February 02, 2017, Research Methodology course presentation), research will 
create other research questions, but there is one over-riding, central question 
that a researcher needs to answer. For the work to be done in this research here 
is the Central Question: 
How well will a set of industrial engineering tools work to improve the 
modified GHH bolter performance to enable the Merensky shaft to 
efficiently mine at a stoping width of 1900mm consistently? 
Sub-questions to central question:  
(i) What type of an improvement approach will the implementation team 
take to ensure the Roof bolter achieves 42 bolts per shift? 
(ii) How will the step approach taken assist in ensuring that 3 bords are 
supported per shift or put it differently, how will the improvement 
approach assist in completing the planned mining cycle within the 
shift?  
(iii) How efficient are the modifications done on 3108a machine in 
ensuring that the 1900 mm stoping width is consistently achieved?  
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The above set of research questions are mainly directed to address the Roof 
bolter performance within a mining system in order to achieve: 
(i) 235m system advance per drill rig section per month 
(ii) 1900m² per drill rig section per month 
(iii) 11 500 tons per drill rig section per month 
(iv) 1.9m stoping width in all stoping bords 
The above results will only be possible if the sub-questions to the central 
research question is adequately addressed through appropriate industrial 
engineering techniques. For the mining cycle to be completed the bolter must 
support three bords or install 42 bolts per 7.5 hours face time, therefore 
confirming that the techniques used are appropriate the mining cycle completion 
is the primary requirement. 
Preliminary progress in answering the central question during the trial phase 
follows, pages 65, 66 and 67 details leading questions to assist in answering the 
above three research sub-questions. These answers will be fully unpacked in 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5: 
(a) Is the GHH bolter fit for purpose to mine at 1900mm stoping width? 
From June 2016 to Nov 2016 we had the GHH bolter 3108 ADE to test. This 
bolter type is currently being used in hardrock mines in both Zimbabwe and 
Botswana. We took this bolter from Botswana as is and implemented it at the 
Merensky Mine as a trial. 
During the trial period, we learned a lot about the capability and the limitations 
of this machine. Operational observations were done by the Engineers and 
the operational staff, and we listened to the Operators’ concerns and 
suggestions. From these interactions, we came up with a number of 
modifications and this led to an upgraded Bolter called 3108a ADE.  At this 
stage, there is no reason to believe that the 3108a bolter is not capable of 
operating in a 1 900mm stope. 
Although this is out of the scope of the author’s research, it must be stated 
that, if the capability of the 3108a bolter can be proven through solid 12 
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months’ record, it could mine at 1900mm with ease and great efficiency, then 
all the mines on the Eastern Limb could start looking at the feasibility of 
mining their Merensky orebodies using the Mechanised Mining Method.  
Currently, there is no mine in the Eastern Limb mining the Merensky reef 
because it is a thin band (1.0 – 1.5m as per Figures 2e and 2f) and will not 
be profitable to mine through conventional methods. When we have a proven 
record of a mechanised system capable of mining the expected planned 
volumes at stoping heights of 1.9m, then the project’s viability would swing to 
profitable zones. 
(b) Are all the bolter modifications requested by Operators done and has it been 
appropriately communicated to them? 
Although the Mine Overseer of the section and the author have started 
intensive communications campaign with the Operators and the Artisans to 
explain the capabilities of the new modified machine, we still have to come up 
with a structured approach to ensure that all new Operators at the Merensky 
Shaft are fully inducted on the 3108a bolter operations. 
(c) Are we (i.e. the mining system and Operators) able to efficiently support the 
blasted bord in 7.5 hours face time - put simply are we achieving 42 bolts/7.5 
hours? 
From all the data compiled, as of June 2016 to November 2016, we have 
seen that the Operators were only able to deliver above 35 bolts per shift 3% 
of the time. (See Figure 4b) Although sometimes they achieved 52 bolts per 
shift. 
However, there remains a lot of work to be done in this area as we still do not 
understand why some Operators are achieving the target while 50% of the 
measured time the Operators are only achieving 19 bolts or less per shift. 
Thorough observations will need to be done and a standardised system 
drawn up to smooth out and normalise the performance. 
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(d) Do we understand why Operators on other operations are able to get 6 
bolts/hour (i.e. 42 bolts per shift) whilst we are not achieving this? 
We do not understand how they get 6 bolts/hour, also an important point to 
note is that even at Bathopele Mine (Anglo American Platinum) where they 
consistently achieved 23 bolts/4.1 hours face time (according to Fourie et al. 
(2014)) they still do not state what they are doing differently in either their 
bolting activity or the cleaning cycle. 
Through observations and benchmarking, the author’s research must unpack this 
further and come up with a structured system. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Sub-section 2.1 in Chapter 2 gave the background of why mines that mine at 
1.75 – 1.9m either use a hand-held drilling support system or an Auto rock 
system. It became clear in the questions asked in 2.1 that there is currently no 
OEM who has an off-the-shelf machine capable of supporting at this stoping 
width.  
In Chapter 3, the author introduced the GHH Roof bolter model name 3108 ADE. 
This Roof bolter was trialled for a period of six months at Booysendal Merensky 
Shaft. Through collaboration of OEM Engineers, Mine Engineers and the 
Operational Implementation team headed by myself, the modified Roof bolter 
machine 3108a was “born”.  
When the modified Roof bolter was designed, the Implementation team, together 
with Engineers, looked at work that was previously done by Andrews and 
Pickering (2010) when implementing the XLP Roof bolter at Anglo Platinum 
Bathopele Mine.  Bathopele Mine implemented improvements in the machine to 
optimise drilling, bolt installation, rod-coupling and machine/boom movement.  
Now that a “fit-for-purpose” Roof bolter customised for Booysendal Mine’s needs 
has been delivered, we investigated how to transform its inputs to deliver 42 bolts 
per shift to optimise its operational performance. 
Chapter 4 addresses the central question asked in page 64 through A3 process 
rolled out in a stepped approach from Implementation stages 1 to Implementation 
stage 3.  
68 
4 IMPROVING THE 3108a SYSTEM TO DELIVER AS PER EXPECTED 
OUTPUT 
The next section will be using the Operations Management tools that the author 
learned while attending lectures offered by Wits University’s Centre of 
Mechanised Mining Systems (CMMS). (See Figure 4a, the Ishikawa diagram, 
which shows the root-cause analysis method which is used as the sub-part of the 
A3 process.) The A3 process was also learned at CMMS and is widely used in 
the Manufacturing sector.  
From here onwards in this report when the author pulls in a concept from 
Operations Management it should be noted that this will be the applied actionable 
knowledge gained while doing Trackless Mining Courses and its related 
concepts. 
4.1    Operations Management: A3 report of the 3108a 
 
Figure 4a: Ishikawa diagram of the 3108a implementation situation  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
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To fully address the Research questions raised in sub-section 3.5 of this report, 
the author was guided by issues raised by Webber et al. (2010) in sub-section 
3.4.2 and from the implementation route followed by Andrews and Pickering 
(2010) in sub-section 3.4.2 of this report. Andrews and Pickering (2010) directed 
the research to critically address the following issues: 
(i) Drilling optimisation 
(ii) Bolt installation optimisation 
(iii) Bolt coupling optimisation  
(iv) Machine/boom movement optimisation 
Prior to start of physical observations and initiating changes to improve the 
performance of the 3108a Roof bolter, it was necessary to critically evaluate the 
current situation (i.e. January 2017 status). So, the research tactic was to follow 
the process of the A3 report as guided by Operation Management Principles (A3 
lecture notes by Hattingh, February 2017). (See complete A3 report of the GHH 
bolter implementation at Merensky Shaft in Appendix 2)   
This part of the report will unpack the Ishikawa diagram findings. (The Ishikawa 
process is the Root-cause Analysis method taught by Hattingh, February 2017)  
Sub sections 4.2- 4.4 will detail how the challenges unearthed through the A3 
report were addressed.  
The root cause analysis was done to understand why the current 3108a 
performance wasn’t reaching the expected, or planned, shift output despite all 
modifications requested by Operators and those identified by the OEM Engineers 
were done. The analysis revealed the following shortcomings: 
(i) Man 
a. Personal impact: The implementation team did several waiting 
place/start of shift meetings in the first week of January 2017. The aim 
of these meetings was to see if the maintenance staff, Operators and 
mining supervisors understood why Management took the decision to 
use the GHH Roof bolter at the Merensky Shaft. Whilst the Mine 
Overseer, Engineering Foreman and some Shift Supervisors had 
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some sketchy ideas of the rationale behind the use of the 3108a 
Bolter, the Roof bolter Operators had no clue and they were even 
concerned about their safety when comparing this bolter to the other 
OEM’s bolter currently used at Booysendal UG2 North Mine. 
b. Implementation involvement: During the waiting place/start of shift 
engagement with the teams, it was also realised that the teams were 
looking for a method that would give them continual feedback on the 
GHH bolter implementation progress and the monthly consolidated 
results to show whether we were on track or not. Simply put, the 
employees were asking for Lean Manufacturing tools similar to the 
ones used by Dunstan et al. (2006) in Rio Tinto case studies.  
Lean tools used by Dunstan are visible performance tracking boards 
at the shift communication centres. The operational team’s main 
concerns were issues of how would they know if the project was a 
success and if we were achieving the set target. They also informed 
the implementation team that they need to be notified on time so they 
could give their inputs on how to improve.  
Simple issues unearthed during these sessions, despite their 
seemingly trivial nature had an immense impact on performance. For 
instance, the maintenance Artisans pointed out to the implementation 
team that while the GHH Roof bolter is fairly simply to maintain and to 
do fault finding, the Engineering Schematic diagrams available to 
them to effect repairs are written in German.  
The Roof bolter Operators had an issue about maintaining the height 
of the bord on the low wall side at 1.7m while the bolt length to be 
installed is 1.8m. The implementation team knew the design had 
already taken into account that a 1.8m bolt can even be installed in a 
1.5m height bord and it was realised that the non-involvement of the 
Mining and Maintenance team was causing all these uncertainties. 
(See Figure 2b for understanding the low wall and high wall sides of 
the bord.) 
c. Benefit realisation and recognition: Operators were concerned about 
the expected targets of the GHH bolter in terms of bolts installed per 
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shift – had those targets ever been achieved in any South African 
platinum Mine and if so, they wanted to know the benchmark. They 
also wanted to know if this bolter changes their condition of 
employment and what effect would have on their monthly bonus when 
we consistently get the 42 bolts per shift per Operator.  
The Implementation team’s selling point here to Operators, bolter 
Operator assistants or Spotters and Artisans, was that Booysendal 
Mine planned another two modules of Merensky Shafts to be started 
in FY 2018 and therefore it placed the Operators, Spotters and 
Artisans in a good position to be Master Drillers, Operators and 
Engineering Foreman of the new Merensky Shafts, and provided all 
current Merensky employees an advantage to be developed and 
promoted when the new shafts come on stream as they will already 
have experience of the orebody and its interface with the GHH bolter 
machines. 
(ii) Machine 
a. Continued improvement not communicated: When the implementation 
team started with unstructured Roof bolter bolting activity 
observations, it was realised a number of modifications that were 
done when the machine was upgraded from 3108 ADE to 3108a ADE 
were not used or even understood by the Operators.  
A typical example was when Operators raised concerns about 
installing Roof bolts on the 1.7m low wall side of the bord. 
Observations showed the Engineers had already incorporated a 
bracket on which to mount the Roof bolt washer and face plate whilst 
the Operator was still in a sitting position on his foldable stool. 
Intensive work had been done by the designers to improve 
performance and also make the Operator’s bolt installation process 
better and quicker, but this hadn’t been passed on to the Operators.  
The implementation team realised early on during the project that 
some of the project’s failure wasn’t because of machine capability, but 
mainly due to training, continual communication and the supervisor’s 
ability to identify Operator challenges and address them appropriately. 
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b. Complexity versus Simplicity (i.e. Operator ergonomics considered): 
The 3108a machine design was based on making the bolting process 
simpler and quicker.  
For example, an accessories storage tray was designed and 
positioned opposite to the operating controls. This means the 
Operator can drill and insert all the accessories within an arm’s reach 
from his sitting position. Drilling, resin insertion and bolting are 
accomplished from under the TRS (Temporary Roof Support) allowing 
maximum efficiency and safety.  
Bolter operating controls are now single-sided with extended canopy 
protection and there is an added vertical bar support complete with an 
operating stool to enhance the Operator’s comfort. 
c. OEM alignment (Only ‘fit-for-purpose’ changes): OEM designers and 
Mine Engineers have a tendency to do innovations based on what 
was seen at a certain international seminar or what was achieved at 
other mines without understanding why such changes were done.  
In the case of Booysendal Mine, when the 3108a machine arrived, 
modifications which were operational imperatives had been left out 
and some minor non-value-added changes had been done instead. 
This was communicated by the implementation team to the OEM 
Engineers.  
As a result, it was understood at an early stage of the project that only 
changes which have been communicated and validated should be 
done. 
(iii) Method 
a. Review SOPs (standard operating procedures) for support grid 
marking, cable anchor installation, the sequence of bolting and 
hanging wall blasting techniques: The implementation team identified 
challenges unique to Merensky Shaft. For instance, when the GHH 
bolter arrived, the SOPs being used with other OEMs machines were 
deemed to be appropriate, so no grid markings, bolt installation 
sequences or hanging wall conditions were taken into account.  
73 
Through unstructured observations it was realised that with the 
current support grid marking based on the SOP, the GHH bolter would 
have to do four set ups while the other OEM bolter was doing only 
two. An SOP revision for the bolt installation as well as for the cable 
anchors was definitely required.  
The Merensky Shaft hanging wall has closely-spaced flat dipping 
joints on the low wall side and this makes the hanging wall uneven on 
the low wall side and poses a challenge of turret stability when drilling 
the low wall side as the Temporary Roof Support canopy and its 
support bar cannot stabilise the boom properly. Surely this challenge, 
while it has no effect on the machine design, has a huge influence on 
the time taken to install bolts on the low wall side. In addition, it then 
becomes necessary to call Explosives Engineers to recommend 
optimised blasting designs for the hanging wall. 
b. Poor preparation from shift to shift: The prevailing mind-set of mine 
middle Management is to measure the supervisors at the end of shift 
on number of bords blasted, but with no consideration taken or 
emphasis placed on preparation for the on-coming shift.  
With the GHH bolter, the emphasis was to drive a process where the 
team is measured on number of bords cleaned, supported and drilled 
ready to blast at the end of shift. The focus on the activities to be 
completed with a suite of equipment will ensure the preparation for the 
on-coming shift is done and the mining cycle is completed. As stated 
in section 2.5, if the bolting process reaches its targets, the chance of 
completing the mining cycle becomes better as bolting is currently 
viewed as a constraint in the cycle. 
c. No Kanban (structured shift handover system): The implementation 
team wanted to find out from the Operators how the activities were 
performed by the previous shift; specifically, how many bords were 
supported and ready for the current shift to pull in machines and start 
drilling the face. The teams had only rough idea and only the miner 
knew the facts. The implementation team realised the need for 
Kanban-type cards to be used from shift to shift as well as a visible 
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information board carrying data on the number of bolts installed, bords 
cleaned and drilled and charged up for blasting. 
(iv) Measurement 
a. Incorrect KPIs for Mining  and Engineering Maintenance team: The 
current practice at Booysendal Mine is to measure the Maintenance 
staff on availability of the machine during shift time of 7.5 hours. 
Booysendal works a two-shift system of 10.5 hours each. The 
maintenance staff has to ensure that in a time frame of 24 hours the 
machine is available for 21 hours. 
There’s a flaw in this measurement though. The Maintenance staff 
can have an 85% availability, but the 15% that is unavailable is the 
peak in-shift bolting time.  
The same with mining team; it gets measured on utilisation. But at 
Booysendal Mine, we are not clear on whether we’re supposed to 
track power pack hours or engine hours.  
To be able to get the full benefit of the maintenance and operations 
teams, both need to be measured on on-shift utilisation. This means 
the focus should be on how many bords were bolted during the 7.5 
hours of available face time, not certain percentages. The number of 
bords will then be the appropriate team shift measurement. 
b. Incorrect Shift KPI: The current measure of performance at trackless 
mines is the output KPI, such as metres per month, tons per month 
and square metres per month. This output based approach then 
automatically directs middle Management to breakdown the monthly 
target into shifts and demand proportional fractions of the target per 
shift, taking into account machine service days.  
If middle Management’s focus is not on input KPIs such as time 
machine started to drill, load and support, the approach is flawed. If 
the mining cycle is completed on time the metres/shift and tons 
becomes the product not the focus area. The implementation team 
realised this is the approach needed to drive with the 3108a bolter 
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implementation. The output KPI for the 3108a bolter is now the 
completed mining cycles. 
c. Operator daily output not ranked: During the waiting place 
engagements, it became clear the Operator’s daily performance in 
terms of bolts installed per shift is erratic and there is significant 
variation on a shift to shift basis. While the variation bothered the 
implementation team it did seem to be an irrelevant issue to the 
Operators at the shaft. It became important to find an approach to 
encourage the drive where Operators to want to achieve consistent 
number of bolts installed per shift and if he doesn’t, he needs to 
understand why.  
The Implementation team suggested a visible Operator tracker with a 
soccer team flavour; the best consistent Operator will be recognised 
and given a T-shirt of his international soccer role model to show him 
he’s operating at the role model’s level. When we tested this 
approach, we found that it resonated well with the young workforce of 
the Eastern Limb. The Booysendal Mine workforce has a majority age 
range between 24 – 30. When the older employees are taken into 
account, the average age on the mine is 37.  
Ranking of Operators and affirming them in front of the teams was 
one approach the implementation team thought could be trialled. It’s 
important to note that this is over and above the performance-based 
bonus. 
The visible performance boards were placed at underground waiting 
places, and daily bolts installed per Operator were recorded at the 
end of shift. At the start of every shift, the miner begins by going 
through the performance with the machine maintenance team present 
so the team can assist if a machine is identified as experiencing 
minor breakdowns.  
The same visible performance charts are also available on the 
surface in front of the Operational Technology Champion’s office, and 
these are also updated daily. 
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The analysis that was done unearthed the above four main causes as the 
underlying issues which resulted in the 3108a not achieving the expected target 
per shift. 
The next two tables, although included in the Appendix 2, are the actions taken 
by the implementation team to ensure we can achieve 235m per month, 1 900m2 
per month, 11 500 tons and 1.9m stoping height in a Rig Section at the Merensky 
Shaft. 
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Table 6a: Action plan to be tracked by the implementation team 
Suspected Cause Action Item Responsible Due Finding – As of 4 January 2017 
i. Personal impact Structured roll-out involving OEMs, mining crews and maintenance 
staff 
Ops Manager + Impl. team 01/17 Done (Communication poster Appendix 1) 
ii. Implementation 
involvement of operational teams 
Structured roll-out involving OEMs, mining crews and maintenance 
staff 
Ops Manager + Impl. team 01/17 Done (Communication poster Appendix 1) 
iii. Benefit realisation & 
Recognition of operators 
Visible daily tracked information at U/G waiting place + surface info. 
centre 
Mine Over. 
Nigel Reeder 
01/17 Already started + have recognised 1
st
 Quarter  
iv. Incorrect KPI for  
Eng. and Mining 
Measure both for Utilisation and availability not separately Ops and Eng Mgrs 06/17 We need to get ‘buy-in’ of organised labour first 
v. Incorrect Shift KPI Measure Cycle completion per shift Ops and Eng Mgrs 06/17 We need to get ‘buy-in’ of organised labour first 
vi. Operator daily output not  
ranked 
Currently being ranked to set benchmark for bonus scheme 
specifications 
Mine Over. 
Nigel Reeder 
01/17 Already started + have recognised 1st Quarter  
vii. Continued improvement  
not communicated 
Physical observations of bolts installation process – not simulations 
but practical 
Impl. Team  06/17 Already started, learnings to be shared in the report 
viii. Complexity vs Simplicity 
3108 to 3108a (operator ergonomics 
 considered) 
Physical observations of bolts installation process – not simulations 
but practical 
Impl. Team  06/17 Early learnings is that modifications or upgrades were 
not communicated well 
ix. OEM alignment = only fit-for-purpose 
changes 
Physical observations of bolts installation process – not simulations 
but practical 
Impl. Team  06/17 Already did a major change to the support canopy’ s 
ducks foot 
x. Review SOPs = grids marking, cable anchors 
installation, sequence of bolting & h/wall blast 
techniques 
Physical observations of bolts installation process – not simulations 
but practical 
Impl. Team  06/17 Already identified three SOPs that are problematic & 
need for blasting technique change 
xi. Poor preparation from shift to shift Bring a bonus measure component Ops Mgr 06/17 We need to get ‘buy-in’ of organised labour first 
xii. No Kanban card 
(Structured handover system) 
Formalise shift exchange cards Ops Mgr 06/17 To be drawn up first 
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited, Implementation team records) 
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Table 6b: Action plan to address Residual challenges 
Investigation  item Responsible Due Status – As of 4 January 2017 
i. Review SOPs = grids marking, cable 
anchors installation, sequence of bolting & 
h/wall last techniques 
Wonderboy & 
Zirk Jansen 
06/17 To address the gaps identified 
during physical observations 
ii. Scrutinise the Effect of Soccer ‘stars’ in 
recognising best performing Bolt operators 
(Pull effect or not?) 
Wonderboy & 
Nigel Reeder 
12/17 Already recognised the 1
st
 
Quarter performers 
iii. Using on-board camera or lasers for 
positioning of the turret over ‘target’ 
support holes 
Robbin Pearce 
& Cules Kolbe 
12/17 Do proposal to the OEM and 
Senior Management approval 
iv. Visit to Mimosa and Bathopele Mines to 
learn if they have any further 
enhancements (SOPs, Bonus system, 
machine modifications or handover system) 
Wonderboy & 
Nigel Reeder 
06/17 OEMs are willing to facilitate 
these visits as they currently 
have machines in these 
operations 
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited, Implementation team records) 
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4.2 Implementation stage 1: Structured Project Roll-out 
 
Figure 4b: Rig Section monthly output as at January 2017  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
The graph and the pie-chart in Figure 4b gives a picture of where the Merensky 
Shaft performance stood when the two modified 3108a machines arrived at the 
mine. It must be noted that from February 2016 to May 2016, the production 
results start as low as 900 m² till to 1 500 m² levels because the barrels 
development fleet from another OEM was used to develop and start the ledging 
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faces. In fact, the results from February 2016 to May 2016 are ledging square 
metres broken, not stoping production.  
To fully analyse the state of stoping performance it is appropriate to do the 
evaluation from June 2016 as that is the month when the Merensky Shaft start 
using the GHH Roof bolter 3108 ADE in the newly established stoping section.  
The average production in the twelve months period including the ledging months 
is 1 575 m² which is 17.25% below the expected output of 1 900 m². For the 
Merensky Shaft to be profitable after paying back the initial capital expenditure, it 
needs to produce a consistent 1 900m² at 1.9m stoping height at a shaft head 
grade of 2.55g/t. 
What was of concern to the implementation team was when the data collected 
from June 2016 to November 2016 showed the 3108 ADE bolter Operators only 
achieved the 35 - 42 bolts installed per shift 3% of the time, installation of 
between 19 and 34 bolts per shift was achieved only 47% of the time, and 50% of 
the time the performance was below what was expected. According to mine 
Management this performance level was unacceptable.  
Although the information collated on the pie-chart painted a gloomy picture, the 
implementation team realised there were areas where it could significantly 
improve this performance. 
Facts that were unearthed through collected data: 
(i) There were Operators who capable of installing from 47 to 52 bolts 
per shift. 
(ii) The very same Operators have times when they installed only 20 bolts 
per shift. So, what conditions existed which allowed them to install 52 
bolts and what changed so they now only install 20? 
(iii) Operators were not aware of what their daily target was in terms of 
number of bolts. 
(iv) Operators were not ranked to be able to benchmark themselves 
against best performers and ultimately share learnings.  
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(v) From August 2016 to Jan 2017, the stoping output ranged between 
1600 & 1900 m², An improvement of even 50% of Operators currently 
getting less than 19 bolts per shift will have significant impact on 
achieving consistent GOAL of output above 1900 m². 
 
Figure 4c: Structured GHH Roof bolter Roll-out  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
The fundamental action identified in the A3 report in Table 6a was the 
implementation involvement. A poster was drawn up to address four key areas of 
the project, giving a summary of: 
 The main intent  
 The current performance status as at January 2017 
 Best Roof bolter performance in a South African underground 
mechanised platinum mine 
 The expected performance levels (See Appendix 1 for the 
Communication poster that was used by the implementation team)  
82 
The implementation team was mindful not to give the team too many 
technical machine details and in-depth Merensky Shaft design details. A lot 
of technical details and unexplained target rationale would not have 
appealed to a young workforce of the Eastern Limb.  
As the team has a keen interest in football, the best mine performance in 
South Africa was linked to the South African Premier League Champions and 
consistent monthly performance was upgraded to International European 
League Championship.  
This approach resonated well with the operational team (See Appendix 3, it 
gives the impression of the Safety Manager’s observations when the 
implementation team was engaging the operational teams as seen in Figure 
4c). The football theme rolled the project ownership onto the operational 
teams, however, moving forward, the implementation team will still guide the 
process.  
The structured Roll-out did ensure the following: 
(i) From the Mine Overseer right through to the Operator there was 
alignment on what the intent for the GHH 3108a bolter was meant to 
do at the Merensky Shaft. 
(ii) Operators would not feel offended or belittled when they saw their 
daily performance displayed on underground and surface 
performance boards. The reason for tracking the daily input KPIs was 
explained to all Operators and they rightly felt the tracking is there to 
assist them to perform better, rather than being used to as a “stick” 
against them. 
(iii) When the implementation team did observations on the physical 
bolting process, Operators were not bothered since they understood 
that these observations were meant to identify areas of improvement 
and it was not going to be used against them. 
(iv) The approach by Operators towards the 3108a bolter changed 
completely. When the bolter was in for scheduled maintenance, 
Operators were keen to assist the maintenance staff with fault finding 
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and even giving tips on what to look for to repair recurring 
breakdowns. 
 
Figure 4d: Stoping width and grade trends up to January 2017  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
Besides achieving the required 1 900m² per month per Rig Section, there are two 
other significant quality factors the GHH Roof bolter performance will be 
evaluated on. (See the trend graphs at Figure 4d). The first graph Stoping 
Width (m), shows the variation in stoping width from 1.99m to 2.03m and the 
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second graph, Actual delivered grade to Mill (g/t), shows an improvement from 
2.19 to 2.43g/ton. The main aim is to consistently mine at 1.9m stoping width as 
per the blue dotted target line. This shows there is still work to be done to reduce 
the additional 0.13m to reach the target of 1.9m. If this is not addressed the 
dilution will increase.  
As at January 2017, the shaft head grade was at 2.43g/ton and this is still 
0.12g/ton below the planned 2.55g/ton target.  
Mining at 1.9m with the current drill rigs at Booysendal Mine is a non-issue. The 
challenge comes with bolting activity.  
First, after the faces have been blasted, the LHDs must load all the flydirt 
properly to allow bolting to be carried out unhindered. Bolter Operators then have 
to comply with Booysendal Mine Support SOP and install all the required bolts on 
the marks and according to the required angles. The bolter Operator also has to 
know and understand the reef stratigraphy well, so that where there are 
deviations he can alert the miner and the shift supervisor.  
While supporting on daily basis, the bolter Operator has to be made aware of the 
bord dimensions on the high wall and low wall sides. The 3108a Roof bolter has 
a 1.56m drill feed (i.e. the turret) which is the best machine to deliver on 1.90m 
stoping width target.  
The last issue to be resolved to ensure 1.9m stoping width is a bolter Operator 
who is capable of communicating either good work observed or anomalies with 
LHD Operator, drill rig Operator, miner and shift supervisors. 
To ensure this challenge is addressed, the implementation team involved the 
Merensky Shaft Mine Technical Services observer and made him aware of the 
importance of teaching Merensky reef stratigraphy not only to miners but also to 
Operators.  
The Mine Technical Services observers are employees trained to identify strata 
and its associated complexities – the observers are allocated per drill rig section. 
The observers play an important role of interpreting strata communicate to 
Operators and supervisors. In the case of the Merensky Shaft, we had the best 
observer on the mine coaching Operators on how to identify strata, stoping width 
anomalies and how to correct for those anomalies.  
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4.3 Implementation stage 2: Physical observations 
 
Figure 4e: Rig Section monthly output as at February 2017  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
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It must be noted that there is significant difference between the results shown in 
Figure 4b and Figure 4e above. Figure 4b results are a mixture of ledging and 
stoping square metres produced using another OEM Roof bolter machine from 
February 2016 to May 2016. But, from June 2016 to Dec 2016, the results were 
obtained using the unmodified GHH Roof bolter 3108 ADE. The average 
production during this time was 1 575m² per month.  
The trends shown in Figure 4e are the results of a combination of 3108 and 
3108a Roof bolters. From June 2016 to December 2016, the performance is from 
GHH Roof bolter 3108 ADE. From January 2017 to February 2017, the results 
were obtained using a modified version of the GHH bolter called 3108a ADE. 
This section discusses improvements following the Roll-out discussed in the 
previous section and looks particularly at performance in February 2017; 
although there’s a 200 m² improvement from December 2016 to February 2017 
to 1 750 m² average production when comparing Figure 4b and Figure 4e 
performance. The implementation team realised that there’s a challenge here – 
the ‘bolts installed’ pie-chart shows there has been a regression in the bolter 
Operators’ performance. The identified performance deterioration is contradicting 
what the implementation team were expecting. It was expected, due to machine 
modifications done and the high awareness level of all Operators at the 
Merensky Shaft, the actual Operator performance would significantly improve.  
Analysis of the underlying issues for this underperformance will be fully unpacked 
in Chapter 5, but for this chapter the research will leave the results as they are. 
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Figure 4f: Physical observations done by the implementation team, the 
above photographs summarises six months’ worth of underground 
structured inspections  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
As mentioned in sub-section 1.7 of this research and also in Table 6a, the 
implementation team did physical observations to look at the bolting process to 
see if the modifications done are yielding expected results, and if not, where do 
the residual challenges lie. 
The author’s modus operandi was, together with the implementation team, to 
observe the best performing Operators and, after doing a total of 24 underground 
inspections, to draw up a process flow directive for all Operators to adhere to as 
best practice (see Figure 4f). 
The author was advised by the research project supervisor Dr Vogt (personal 
communication, January 2017) that it would add value to also observe the worst 
performers to identify what doesn’t work. When the process flow directive is 
issued it would then have a well-rounded view of both best and poor 
performance. As a result, the implementation team observed a mixture of 
Operators’ best performers, average and worst performers. 
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Initial observation findings: What did not work? 
(i) The Operator’s head and limb was exposed to an unsupported area when 
he changed the drill steel, inserted resins and installed the Roof bolt into 
the drilled hole. The duck’s foot which was requested when the 3108 ADE 
was modified was not incorporated in the design of the 3108a bolter. The 
Mine Engineering team in charge of commissioning new machines on 
mine failed to identify this critical omission.  
When the implementation team realised the Operator risk exposure when 
operating this equipment without a protection mechanism, it was decided 
to stop the machine. OEM Engineers and Mine Engineers had some 
design change sessions where a risk assessment, Change management 
and commitment to deliver the Temporary Roof Support canopy 
incorporating the extended duck’s foot was agreed upon.  
(ii) Operators raised a concern that when they are installing Roof bolts on the 
low wall side of the bord it becomes difficult and risky to push the bolt into 
the hole due to 1.5 – 1.7m height when the bolt length is 1.8m (See 
Figure 2c to understand the configuration and dimensions of the low wall 
side of the bord). 
During their observations, the OEM Engineers realised the steel bracket 
mounted on the side of the drifter to ensure pushing the bolt becomes 
easier was not communicated to Operators, although this feature is now 
available in the 3108a Roof bolter. 
It was physically demonstrated by the OEM technicians in a 1.6m height 
that once the Roof bolt is pushed slightly into the hole, one needs to 
ensure that the face plate and the conical washer rests on the steel 
bracket. Then, as the drifter moves up, the bracket assists in pushing the 
Roof bolt into the hole. After the demonstration, the Operators 
immediately started using the bracket. The implementation team 
recommended that this bracket functionality be included in the lesson 
plans and even in the Roof bolt installation SOP. 
(iii) Trial time studies indicated a variation in times taken to move and set up 
the machine from one hole to the other and also a variation in boom 
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movement times (See Table 7a). The implementation team was keen to 
understand what led to this time variation. 
Observation showed that moving the boom from one hole to the next and 
positioning the cross hair for commencing to drill varies significantly from 
one Operator to the next. The motion and time study results to be 
discussed in sub-section 4.5 of this report, show the time for boom 
movement and positioning the turret on the support marks varies from 1 
minute 45 seconds to sometimes 6 minutes.  
Any bolting cycle improvement initiatives must be directed into reducing 
the movement and positioning time variation. Operators gave the 
implementation team a number of practical solutions on how to address 
the gap. This will be dealt with later in the report. 
(iv) A gap was identified in the current support grid marking off SOP. Although 
the support grid had been risk assessed and changed for the Merensky 
Shaft as compared to the Booysendal Mine UG2 Shaft, the marking off 
SOP was not amended.  
The support lines are spaced 1.5 metres apart on strike both on UG2 and 
Merensky Shaft. At the UG2 Shaft, the support marking off SOP restricts 
the miner to marking off one at a time. After the installation of the row of 
bolts, then the second line can be marked off – this is mainly due to 
stoping heights of 2.2 – 2.6 metres.  
Now, without even considering that the 1.7 – 1.9 metres height in the 
Merensky Shaft allows the miner to mark off two lines with a charging 
stick whilst the miner is in one position, it was decided to have the same 
marking off SOP as that of the UG2 Shaft. 
The effect of this means the GHH Roof bolter has to do four machine set 
ups to drill and install 14 Roof bolts required for 3.0 metres face advance 
compared to two set ups on the UG2 operation. This definitely needs to 
be reviewed to align to the Merensky Shaft conditions and to optimise 
drilling so the machine only needs to be set up twice. 
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Initial observation findings: What worked well and why? 
(i) With the 3108 ADE Roof bolter, the support accessories (i.e. Roof bolts, 
resins and drill steel) used to be placed at the rear of the machine on top 
of engine top covers. This meant the Spotter had to take accessories from 
the rear and pass it to the Operator at the front who was busy operating 
the controls. With the modification from 3108 ADE to 3108a ADE a simple 
rectangular storage tray was incorporated into the design. 
When the implementation team did its observations, it was obvious how 
such a simple, trivial innovation could impact the bolting cycle. The 
accessories were now within arm’s reach of the Operator while he is 
sitting in his foldable stool inside drill platform.  
The process improvement brought about by this addition, meant the 
Operator has all the accessories for drilling and installing all 14 Roof bolts 
without requiring any assistance from the Spotter/Roof bolter Operator 
assistant. While the bord is being supported, the Spotter can co-ordinate 
with the utility vehicle Operator on the material required for the next bord 
support, and arrange that when the Roof bolter gets to that bord 
accessories are loaded into the storage tray. 
(ii) A drill mast or platform with a foldable stool has now been incorporated 
into the 3108a design. The OEM claimed the following when they 
designed this platform: “Drilling, resin insertion and bolting are 
accomplished from under the TRS (Temporary Roof Support) allowing 
maximum efficiency and safety.  
Bolter operating controls are now single-sided with an extended canopy 
protection and an added vertical bar support, complete with an operating 
stool to enhance Operator comfort.” 
The implementation team observed Operators carrying out the Roof bolt 
installation while sitting down on the foldable steel stool is not ideal, it 
does however make a huge difference when installing Roof bolts on the 
low wall side as compared to the previous machine (3108 ADE) where the 
Operator had to squat when working at these heights. 
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(iii) Another claim by the OEM reads: “The boom now lifts, swings and 
extends to allow for 4 000mm straight line bolt installation from one 
chassis position. Fore and aft tilting capabilities of the rotary drill unit, 
combined with a vertical extendable foot well facility, enables not only 
'angle bolting’ but also allows for bolting up to heights of 2,6 metres.” The 
implementation team did physically observe the ease of installation of 
bolts 0.5m from the sidewall and from the face.  
Something which was difficult with the 3108 ADE, had now been made 
simpler through the combination of a steel bracket on the drifter, fore and 
aft tilting modification and a sitting provision to enable the installation of 
the Roof bolt on the low wall side even in 1.5 - 1.7m heights. 
(iv) Different tests and trials were done on alternative resin size combinations. 
Different size bolts were also tested. The observations done by the 
implementation team were to verify if the 18mm Roof bolt diameter size 
and 23mm resin capsules were an ideal combination in practice.  
The resin capsule length was now a combination of two: one quick-setting 
capsule 500 mm long and the normal setting 700 mm long. This 
combination basically translated in resin installation, bolt insertion and 
spanner time to 1 minute. New Operators battled to properly insert the 
plastic parachutes in the resin capsules and so struggled to complete the 
task in 1 minute. However, once they got used to handling the parachutes 
they also came in around 1 minute. 
(v) The 25mm drill steel is a lightweight easy-to-handle Kennametal 
Stackable hex tube drill stem. A simple combination of 1.2m and 0.9 m 
drill rods is used to drill the required 1.75m hole. Features that made this 
combination possible are:  
 The vacuum chuck/bit seat where the tungsten drill bit is coupled.  
 The vacuum rod coupler which connects two drill stems together.  
 The vacuum chuck adaptor which fits into the drifter and in turn 
connects the combined drill stem to the turret system. 
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Figure 4g: Stoping width and grade trends up to March 2017  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
As explained previously in sub-section 4.2 besides achieving the required           
1 900m² per month per rig section, there are two other significant quality factors 
on which the GHH Roof bolter performance will be evaluated.  
The first graph at Figure 4g, Stoping Width (m), shows a further deterioration in 
terms of stoping width from 2.03m to 2.14m.  
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The second graph, Actual grade delivered to Mill (g/t) shows a flat 
performance in the region of 2.42g/ton. The main aim is to consistently mine at 
1.9m stoping width as per the blue dotted target line. The picture above shows 
that instead of an expected improvement of 0.13m, the stoping width further 
deteriorated by 0.14m to result with an effective overbreak of 24cm. 
The implementation team had already observed the challenge posed by closely 
spaced flat dipping joints on the low wall side of both North and South sides 
bords (See Figure 2c). These structures in the hanging wall resulted with some 
bords exceeding the 1.7m required on the low wall side. This does not mean the 
3108a is not capable of delivering 1.9m planned stoping width (See Appendix 4 
for best cut bords).  It does, however, need further geological mapping 
consolidation and the involvement of the Explosives Suppliers experts in 
designing appropriate rounds and low density explosives for charging up top 
holes. 
Another significant finding which came to the implementation team’s attention 
was that because of difficulties experienced by the bolter Operators in drilling and 
installing long anchors using a 3108a machine, they were arranging with drill rig 
Operators to open up the stoping width so they could use another OEM hybrid 
bolter to install the long anchors. 
There are two issues the author wish to bring to your attention here. 
Firstly, as at January 2017, the shaft head grade was 2.43g/t which is not the 
planned head grade of 2.55g/t. The fact is, we are below plan. 
Secondly, the average stoping width as at January 2017, deteriorated when 
compared to the previous months. As a result, one would expect the grade to 
deteriorate even further. But, looking at the graph it can be seen that it didn’t. 
This was because some of the bords were mined way better than the average 
1.9m stoping width required. (See Appendix 4. Here it can be seen that some 
bords do in fact have an effective stoping width of 1.7m). 
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4.4 Implementation stage 3: Process scrutiny and effects on mining 
cycle 
 
Figure 4h: Rig Section monthly output as at May 2017  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
The trend graph and the installed bolts pie-chart in Figure 4h are now a mid-way 
test for this study (i.e. A six-month test of the twelve months’ Roll-out). These 
results link to sub-section 4.1, Table 6a, where the implementation team 
identified the corrective actions to optimise 3108a implementation. The graphs 
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are a further validation of actions effected as per sub-section 4.3 as the results 
revealed if the actions were appropriate to effect the change required.  
When comparing the April and May 2017 production results to the 12 months’ 
average of 1 575m² it’s clear the 1 750m² target set, as per Appendix 2, have 
already been surpassed. In fact, on close scrutiny of the May 2017 results, 300m 
system advance was achieved instead of the planned 235m.  
In terms of bolts installed per shift per Operator, it was planned that by December 
2017, a 13% improvement on both 35 – 42 and 19 – 34 bolts category is 
required. The target for 19 – 34 bolts has already been exceeded by 1% to 
achieve 61% in May 2017.  
This achievement affirms the actions of sub-section 4.3 are appropriate and need 
to be reinforced further.  
While a concern can be raised with regard to the 35 – 42 bolts category - in that 
the study is already half-way and the improvement is only 3% instead of 6.5% - 
the implementation team realised the improvement in the 19 -34 category has 
already made it possible for the section to achieve 2.5 bords supported per shift 
consistently. 
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Figure 4i: Operator installed both Roof bolts and cable anchors in the 
above observation, although it is a sequential process as both are done in 
series  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
Final observation findings: What did not work? 
(i) With each blast on both the UG2 and Merensky Shafts, a 4.0m camera 
hole was drilled into the hanging wall to identify any separation in the 
hanging wall strata prior to blast. Once strata separation was observed, 
the section gets issued a technical instruction to install two lines of 4.5m 
cable anchors. The implementation team observed, drilling 4.5m was 
fairly simple with a 41mm bit and using the Kennametal hex stackable drill 
steel.  
The challenge was when the Operators retract the drill steel. On 
numerous occasions it was observed that the last drill steel gets stuck 
and only experienced Operators could retract it. Last drill steel getting 
stuck could be attributed to two issues:  
Operator lowers the drifter unit 
and then inserts the next drill rod  
Operator inserting the Resin 
Capsule. On the end of the 
capsule there is a plastic cap that 
prevents it from falling out 
Operator spins and pushes the 
bolt into the hanging wall, then 
waits 45 seconds for the resin to 
cure and then tensions it by 
rotation  
Roof bolt conical washer 
mounted on the bracket to push 
up the hole 
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 The stem sticks as the blade configured bit gets worn out as it 
drills the last part of the 4.5 m hole, curving that part of the hole. 
 The second issue is maybe the stackable system is only effective 
for holes less than 3.0m. Above 3.0m, a screw type drill steel has 
to be used. 
At this stage, the implementation team doesn’t have a solution to this. 
But, it has been seen it makes the cable anchor installation process 
onerous and difficult to complete within a shift, posing significant delays to 
the mining cycle. The combination of all drill rods to achieve an effective 
4.5m hole is four 1.2 m drill rods. 
The recommendation that is currently underway to deal with this 
challenge is: Hole size – the long anchors have an OD (outer diameter) of 
38mm (expansion shell). We have changed our bit diameter to 41mm so 
there is no interference on installation of the long anchor.  
According to the Mine Overseer, after changing from 35mm to 41mm bit, 
both the drilling and drill steel retrieval have been achieved without any 
challenges. 
(ii) The SOP for marking off and the installation of cable anchors at the UG2 
Shaft calls for one line at a time. The learning point for the implementation 
team and myself was that the Merensky Shaft imported the UG2 SOPs 
without fully understanding the rationale underlying the risk assessment 
done at the time, nor the rationale for adhering to a certain sequence.  
If the cable anchor process is to adhere to the current SOP then it means 
the machine has to do four set ups to enable it to install 10 bolts installed 
at 5 bolts per line.   
Any trackless orientated miner will definitely notice that the impractical 
number of set ups will encourage the Operators to develop at-risk 
behaviours in order to complete their daily allocated task.  
The implementation team agreed the cable anchor marking off and 
installation SOP for the Merensky Shaft using the 3108a bolter will need 
to be reviewed. It can’t be a ‘copy and paste’ of the UG Shaft without 
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analysing the impact on the support installation process and its negative 
effect on the mining cycle. 
(iii) The OEM claimed the following: “The bolter unit has an operational 
flexibility with regard to an alternative power source. Usually the unit 
operates on a dedicated power plug in system. It can alternatively operate 
on diesel power through its tramming power unit.” In practice, the unit 
experienced frequent cut outs when tramming from one bord to the next 
when powered by electricity. As a result, most Operators preferred to use 
diesel power when tramming as it was much more reliable than electricity. 
Initial observation findings: What worked well and why? 
(i) The 3108 ADE Roof bolter machine did not have the capability to install 
cable anchors. This was a significant limitation because it meant that 
once the strata separation was identified, footwall ripping had to be done 
to allow a minimum height of 2.1m, so that a different OEM Roof bolter 
capable of drilling and installing cable anchors could be brought in into the 
bord.  
The author mentioned previously that additional waste will increase 
dilution and this will make the Merensky Project financially unattractive. 
It’s a business and operational imperative to find a solution to this issue. 
The 3108a has the capability of installing both the 18mm Roof bolts and 
the 18mm cable anchors. This capability was made possible by the cable 
anchor supplier who was able to change the anchor diameter from 38mm 
to 18mm, but still has the ability to take a 38 ton load. 
(ii) Both the Roof bolts and the cable anchors are installed while the Operator 
is under cover or protection of the TRS (Temporary roof support) canopy. 
This canopy protection may be a simple addition when operating in stable 
hanging wall conditions such as UG2 hanging wall, but when considering 
the Booysendal Merensky Shaft’s closely spaced flat dipping joints in the 
hanging wall, then this addition is really adding value.  
Both primary support and secondary support can be done in series. In 
other words, in terms of Rock Engineering principles, both beam building 
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and suspension can be achieved while the Operator is safe under the 
canopy and the duck’s foot. 
 
Figure 4j: Stoping width and grade trends up to May 2017  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
The final stoping width and shaft head grade results above shows there’s still 
work to be done to get the dilution to acceptable levels and ensure that the 
Merensky Shaft remains profitable. 
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There was a further regression of 0.13m in the stoping width from March to May 
2017. However, as mentioned in sub-section 4.3, the implementation team is 
aware of the challenge posed by the Geology and that is being addressed.  
The stoping width is off plan by 37cm and in a profit-orientated organisation like 
Northam Platinum, the pressure is on to ensure all bords are the same quality as 
those seen in Appendix 4.  
Geology mapping, in terms of understanding the hanging wall strata and blast 
design change, are not in the scope of this study. This presents an opportunity to 
the Northam Platinum Technical Services technical staff to take this further. 
With no improvement in the stoping width, the shaft head grade is also not 
improving. It is staying flat around the 2.40g/ton mark. This actual head grade is 
0.15g/ton below the planned grade and, when considering the 11 500 tons 
delivered per month, this equates to 1.84kg 4E below plan per month. Once 
again, with Northam Platinum being a Lean company focused on Continuous 
Improvement, the 22kg 4E below business plan per annum will definitely need to 
be attended to and sorted out. Especially considering there are already two other 
Merensky modular shafts planned as of FY 2019. 
4.5 Progress on the A3 report implementation plan 
To validate the time-and-motion study results achieved during the project trial 
stage, the author arranged an implementation time-and-motion study to be done 
by experienced Booysendal Mine trackless mobile machine instructors. He drew 
up templates to be used by the instructors and then briefed the HRD Training 
Head, Thys Marais, on what was the expected data to be collected.  
The two instructors, together with Thys Marais, observed six different Roof bolter 
Operators over a period of 4 weeks. The six Operators involved in this exercise 
had varying experience levels on the bolter machine varying from 4 months (i.e. 
the least experienced) to 14 months (best experienced).  
This section (4.5.1) gives the consolidated results of the time study done.  
Table 7a gives the daily data recorded over period of four weeks.  
Table 7b gives the summarised weekly data recorded per Operator. 
The page after Table 7b gives the raw observations of the observers who 
recorded the data.  
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The author made it clear to Thys Marais and his instructors that they must only 
observe and record activity times without interfering or interrogating the Operator 
on why he carries out his functions the way he does. Thys and his team went 
further than required, by also noting down their observations (see page 106). 
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4.5.1 Time study results 
Table 7a: Actual Times Observed  
Machine 
Number 
GHH Bolter 203 GHH Bolter 202 
Day  Day 1 Day 3 Day 4 Day 2 Day 3 Day 4 Day 3 Day 1 Day 4 Day 1 Day 3 Day 4 Day 5 Day 1 Day 2 
Date 
20-Mar-
17 
22-Mar-
17 
23-Mar-
17 
28-Mar-
17 
29-Mar-
17 
30-Mar-
17 
05-Apr-
17 
20-Mar-
17 
23-Mar-
17 
27-Mar-
17 
29-Mar-
17 
30-Mar-
17 
31-Mar-
17 
03-Apr-
17 
04-Apr-
17 
Board Number Board 1 
Hole Number Duration 
1 00:10:28 00:09:50 00:07:03 00:14:48 00:14:38 00:10:11 00:08:03 00:07:36 00:13:08 00:17:31 00:10:50 00:09:05 00:12:09 00:12:07 00:09:33 
2 00:08:05 00:09:01 00:07:21 00:12:08 00:09:05 00:09:38 00:08:05 00:10:13 00:11:45         00:11:22 00:08:21 
3 00:07:55 00:09:15 00:07:58 00:12:01 00:10:28 00:10:43 00:09:48 00:11:32 00:11:48         00:13:48 00:08:00 
4 00:07:38 00:07:05 00:09:28 00:10:01 00:10:25 00:09:33 00:12:20 00:13:08 00:12:30         00:10:20 00:11:53 
5 00:08:03 00:09:40 00:10:31 00:10:55 00:13:45 00:11:21 00:08:06 00:14:26 00:12:16         00:14:07 00:10:16 
6 00:08:05 00:07:23 00:08:33 00:12:46 00:09:28 00:12:36 00:07:18 00:10:38 00:08:16         00:12:21 00:07:46 
7 00:09:43 00:09:00 00:11:58 00:16:03 00:11:20 00:09:58 00:08:10 00:13:58 00:11:51           00:10:23 
8 00:07:13 00:10:16 00:10:50 00:12:40 00:08:23 00:10:34 00:11:10 00:11:15 00:11:39           00:09:27 
9 00:13:36 00:08:26 00:09:43   00:09:41   00:09:07                 
10 00:07:36 00:17:36 00:11:33   00:09:33                     
11   00:10:51 00:08:43   00:10:41                     
12   00:09:36 00:10:28   00:09:36                     
13     00:10:03                         
Board Number Board 2 
Hole Number Duration 
1   00:06:55                           
2   00:09:05                           
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3   00:06:06                           
4   00:11:45                           
5   00:10:10                           
6   00:08:45                           
7   00:08:11                           
8   00:07:20                           
9   00:08:51                           
10   00:10:16                           
11   00:09:11                           
12   00:07:21                           
Average 
duration of 
bolt installed 
00:08:50 00:09:15 00:09:33 00:12:40 00:10:35 00:10:34 00:09:07 00:11:36 00:11:39 00:17:31 00:10:50 00:09:05 00:12:09 00:12:21 00:09:27 
Best duration 
of bolt 
installation  
00:07:13 00:06:06 00:07:03 00:10:01 00:08:23 00:09:33 00:07:18 00:07:36 00:08:16 00:17:31 00:10:50 00:09:05 00:12:09 00:10:20 00:07:46 
Worst 
duration of 
bolt 
installation 
00:13:36 00:17:36 00:11:58 00:16:03 00:14:38 00:12:36 00:12:20 00:14:26 00:13:08 00:17:31 00:10:50 00:09:05 00:12:09 00:14:07 00:11:53 
Holes Drilled 10 24 13 8 12 8 9 8 8 1 1 1 1 6 8 
Average 
duration to 
move and set 
up machine 
from installed 
bolt to 
collaring of 
hole 2 
00:01:07 00:02:04 00:01:04 00:01:18 00:00:56 00:00:11 00:00:59 00:02:16 00:02:15 00:04:01 00:02:07 00:00:29 00:01:02 00:00:59 00:01:07 
Duration to 
position boom  
00:00:29 00:00:33 00:00:45 00:00:46 00:00:50 00:01:04 00:00:41 00:01:15 00:01:33 00:02:06 00:02:49 00:01:25 00:00:52 00:00:26 00:00:28 
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Duration to 
drill a hole 
00:04:20 00:04:23 00:05:22 00:07:08 00:06:03 00:05:34 00:04:57 00:04:58 00:05:12 00:07:40 00:04:44 00:04:24 00:07:37 00:06:56 00:05:12 
Duration resin 
installed, 
insert the bolt 
and spanner 
00:00:59 00:01:38 00:01:11 00:01:36 00:01:20 00:00:48 00:01:20 00:02:15 00:01:06 00:01:10 00:01:11 00:02:02 00:01:46 00:02:09 00:00:58 
Duration 
spinning and 
tension the 
bolt 
00:01:08 00:00:47 00:00:47 00:01:48 00:02:10 00:01:21 00:00:56 00:01:46 00:01:48 00:02:30 00:00:59 00:01:16 00:01:13 00:01:20 00:01:32 
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited, Bolter Time Study Results) 
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Table 7b: Weekly Summary of the observed times 
 
Weekly Comparison 
 
Operator Name 
Operator Comparisons Jeffery Simelane Ganghthol Sithole Richard Mathonsi Rovers Ratau Widney Pilusa Alfred Mashilo 
Holes drilled 47 15 28 1 14 9 
Average time of bolt installed 00:09:13 00:11:37 00:10:57 00:10:50 00:10:54 00:09:07 
Best time of bolt installation  00:06:47 00:07:56 00:09:19 00:10:50 00:09:03 00:07:18 
Worst time of bolt installation 16:05:20 00:13:47 00:14:26 00:10:50 00:13:00 00:12:20 
Boards drilled 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Average Time to move and set up 
machine from installed bolt to collaring 
of hole 2 
00:01:07 00:02:16 00:00:48 00:02:07 00:01:03 00:00:59 
Time to position boom  00:00:36 00:01:24 00:00:53 00:02:49 00:00:27 00:00:41 
Time to drill a hole 00:04:42 00:05:05 00:06:15 00:04:44 00:06:05 00:04:57 
Time resin installed ,insert the bolt and 
spanner 
00:01:16 00:01:40 00:01:15 00:01:11 00:01:34 00:01:20 
Time spinning and tension the bolt 00:00:54 00:01:47 00:01:46 00:00:59 00:01:26 00:00:56 
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited, Bolter Time Study Results) 
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Observer’s Comments (TMM Instructor Observations):  
Depending on the stoping width, it could take a long time to setup the machine 
for drilling. 
One drill bit can drill only 2 holes and the jumper exchange takes a lot of time. 
Because of the confined space in the bolting cap and rods, it takes longer to 
insert the bolt if the stoping height is low. 
Spanner bolting could become loose. 
Barring can take longer than expected. 
Power could trip at the rig box. 
Second rod could get stuck in the hole, and take almost 15+ minutes to remove. 
Water leaked onto machine and after fixing, the Operator bent the rod in the 
second hole. 
Machine had a problem when moving forward on electrical power. When moving, 
the machine cuts off. 
Low water supply on machine. Problem was fixed 
Hanging wall was very low and the Operator took a long time using short jumpers 
and fitting in the bolt. 
Machine stopped due to high temperature. 
Operator struggled to remove the first rod. 
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4.5.2 Recognition of Best Performing Operators: Soccer stars theme 
(mainly EU and RSA Premier League) 
 
Figure 4k: Best Operators up until February 2017 being rewarded by the 
Operational Technology Champion  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
As mentioned in sub-section 4.1, recognising Operator performance is a key 
issue that was implemented. While recognising the star performers heightened 
the morale of the Merensky team, Management was gathering practical 
implementable output targets against which to benchmark the Operators.  
The best top three Operators from December 2016 to March 2017 were ranked 
and recognition was given to them by the Operational Technology Champion 
Nigel Reeder (Figure 4k).  
It must be stated clearly that none of the top three Operators achieved the 
planned 42 bolts per shift.  
Operators 1 and 2 consistently achieved 34 bolts installed per shift. This is still 8 
bolts less than the planned target. However, although the Operators were made 
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aware that we are not on planned target yet, the implementation team decided 
that recognition would be given for the results they did achieve.  
Operator 3 consistently achieved 30 bolts per shift but also had days when he 
reached 35 bolts per shift. The implementation team gave them all football T-
shirts as a token of encouragement for self-improvement.  
As stated in the action plan in Table 6a in sub-section 4.1 of this report, meagre 
benefit realisation and Operator recognition was one of the root causes of poor 
performance that had to be addressed. 2017 Quarter 1 recognition was meant to 
start delivering on the promise made by the implementation team to Operators 
during the structured project Roll-out. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The actions carried out by the implementation team and the time study carried 
out in sub-sections 4.3 and 4.5 respectively delivered the following results: 
(i) April 2017 measuring month, the 235m milestone, 1 900m² and 
11 500 tons were achieved. 
(ii) May 2017 measuring month, the 235m milestone was surpassed and 
300m, 2401m² and 14 532 tons was achieved. 
(iii) An increase of 3% to bring the total to 6% the number of times 
Operators installed 35 – 42 bolts per shift. 
(iv) An increase of 14% to bring the total to 61% the number of times the 
Operators installed 19 – 34 bolts per shift. 
(v) An increase from April’s two bords supported per shift to 2.5 bords 
supported per shift. 
(vi) Deterioration in the stoping by total of 37cm by May 2017 measuring 
month. 
(vii) Shaft head grade remains unchanged at 2.40g/ton level. 
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5 SCRUTINY OF THE 3108a ACHIEVED RESULTS 
5.1  Analysis of results – minutes per bolt installed 
At this stage, are the Booysendal Mine implementation results comparable to 
results achieved in Bathopele Mine XLP trials, Lonmin projects and Booysendal 
trial?   
Table 8 will show the available results so far and the differences will be explained 
in the paragraphs to follow. 
Table 8: Comparison of 3108a performance with other similar or same 
category Roof bolters (Bolts installation times) 
(Source: Author’s own performance consolidation from different sources) 
According to Pickering and Leon (2008), the trial of the XLP Mechanised Breast 
at Bathopele Mine (previously known as Waterval Mine) was based on three 
eight-hour shifts per day and effective equipment available times of 6.2 hours per 
eight-hour shift.  
Although the Bathopele bolt length is different from Booysendal Mine bolt length, 
both the simulated and rated performance, including the actual results achieved, 
give a base from which to start for the Booysendal Mine implementation. The 
Bathopele Mine Roof bolt is a 1.6m resin bolt, the XLP Roof bolter has to install 
24 bolts per panel in a 25m face length including the advanced strike drive 
(ASD). 
Bathopele Mine 
XLP 
Lonmin XLP 
project 
Booysendal 3108 
trial  
Booysendal 3108a 
implementation 
Simulated times: 
9.84 minutes/ bolt 
 
Actual times: 
10.7 minutes/bolt 
 
 
 
Actual times: 
10 minutes/ bolt 
Best: 
6.31 minutes/bolt 
 
Average: 
8.05 minutes/bolt 
 
Worst: 
13.04 minutes/bolt 
 
Best: 
8.69 minutes/bolt 
 
Average: 
10.54 minutes/bolt 
 
Worst: 
13.17 minutes/bolt 
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Inside the panel, the Roof bolt has to install total of 18 bolts and it did this in 3.2 
hours. This means that in one shift an XLP Roof bolter will complete one face 
and then travel to the next panel to set-up and install a minimum of 5 bolts for the 
next shift.  
Pickering and Leon (2008) asserts that the Bathopele trial was a success as it 
consistently and safely delivered the planned 2 400m2/month. However, what 
they did not disclose is that the 2 400m2/month was delivered using two suites of 
equipment – an LP fleet for the advanced strike drive (ASD) and an XLP fleet for 
the panel.  
It was shown in the Implementation stage 3 (i.e. Figure 4h) that a single suite of 
an LP fleet at Booysendal Merensky Shaft produced 2400m2 whilst at Bathopele 
Mine both the XLP and LP fleet combination is required to produce the same. 
Webber et al. (2010) explain Lonmin’s aim with the Roll-out of XLP fleet at the 
Hossy shaft. Although their actual results are actually setting the industry 
benchmark, they don’t seem content with what was achieved. The following 
statement from Webber unpacks this “The XLP bolter utilises a single boom to 
drill and install 1.6m split resin bolts. Roof bolts are installed on a spacing of 1m 
(dip) by 1.5m (strike). The XLP bolter has a total cycle time, taking account of 45 
minutes of tramming and set-up, of 5 hours and 20 minutes. As a result, the XLP 
bolter can complete the support of a 26.5m panel length (installing 32 resin bolts) 
in less than a shift. The bolter’s cycle time of 5 hours 20 minutes currently 
represents the longest cycle times in the fleet of equipment, and options of 
separating the drilling of support holes and installation of the Roof bolts are under 
investigation”. 
Lonmin wanted to prove that separating the two activities would have resulted 
with a cycle time improvement of 1 hour 40 minutes. This was not taken further. 
However, they would have achieved more if they had done time studies and 
optimised the same sequential activities, instead of going for the total process 
change they decided upon. 
The objective of the Booysendal Mine trial of the 3108 ADE Roof bolter and the 
3108a Roof bolter implementation was the same; it was planned that the bolter 
should install a 1.8m bolt in 8 minutes. The only difference between the two 
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phases was that the trial phase was first to proof if the 3108 Roof bolter can mine 
consistently at 1900 mm stoping width. 
The trial stage results are mixed as these are the combined results of the GHH 
trainer/Operator and Booysendal Operators. Bolt installation times achieved 
during the trial averaged at 7.45 bolts per hour translating to 8.0 minutes per bolt. 
While this was a phenomenal and world class performance, the reality is that it 
was done under a controlled environment. The trial section was given to GHH 
and the author chose an area with the least geological features as the test site.  
As soon as the implementation started, the 3108a was tested under a ‘real/harsh 
mining’ environment (i.e. production pressure, geologically complex, mine 
machine Operators not GHH trainers, effect of overall equipment efficiencies), 
the results were different. The average installed bolt time was 5.7 bolts per hour, 
translating to 10.54 minutes per bolt. Booysendal Mine did not achieve its own 
target of 8 minutes per bolt as planned. However, the actual results compared 
fairly well with the Bathopele and Lonmin Mines results of 6 bolts per hour (10 
minutes/bolt). 
From the time studies conducted in this research, two areas were identified within 
the bolting cycle where improvements could be made to achieve the 8 minutes 
per bolt.  
Although the 8 minutes was not achieved, the research at this stage gives a 
credible benchmark across the South African Mining industry to have firm and 
confirmed Roof bolter performance figures, especially when doing mechanised 
mine feasibility studies, or when intending to change from auto rock machine 
bolting to mechanised bolting. It also gives OEM machine designers actual 
figures to work with as a base for their design assumptions rather than relying 
solely on simulated performance figures. 
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5.2  Human factors affecting the 3108a performance and why 
Through the root cause analysis method (i.e. the Ishikawa diagram in Figure 4a) 
it was realised that Operators and maintenance staff wanted the 3108a project to 
be a success, but they had concerns regarding the personal impact, 
implementation involvement and benefit realisation. Before investigating what 
other researchers have concluded with regard to the people side of a technology 
Roll-out, it must be stated that the Operators at Merensky Shaft are new to the 
industry. Although their years of service in the industry ranges between 1 – 12 
years, all of the 3108a Roof bolter Operators had 4 to 14 months experience 
since being appointed to the Roof bolter Operator occupation. 
Pickering (2004) outlined the following critical issues with regard to people in 
technology implementation projects: 
(i) People at all levels in an organisation must see the benefits of the 
technology for themselves. 
(ii) Training people in the application of a new technology requires a 
professional approach. 
(iii) People must be educated in the concepts on which the new 
technology is based. 
(iv) Unanticipated consequences during the introduction of new 
technologies can lead to failure of the technology transfer process. 
(v) Champions are essential at all levels in the mining hierarchy.  They 
must be identified early and adequately supported by their superiors 
and the staff involved in the technology transfer. In Figure 4k, it can 
be seen that the Merensky Mine Overseer has taken seriously what 
Pickering (2004) asserts in his research paper. 
(vi) The introduction of new technology, although a complex social 
process, can and must be carefully planned and managed. The 
structured Roll-out process in Appendix 1 and the A3 process in 
Appendix 2 show that 3108a implementation team really took heed 
and acted as per the guidelines given by Pickering (2004). 
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(vii) It is easier to transfer incremental change than it is to transfer 
technologies which result in significant changes in the work practices. 
Evidence to this is that the trial was used to introduce the 3108 ADE 
as is, then, with the upgrades requested by Operators were 
incorporated in the modified 3108a, it was not a totally new machine 
requiring Operators to be trained from scratch.  
Vogt and Hattingh (2015) explain the following with regard to technology Roll-out 
in the platinum mines; miners in the platinum sector have often commented on 
the relative ease of introducing new technology on the Eastern Limb of the 
Bushveld Complex compared with the Western Limb. Miners on the Eastern Limb 
are usually new from local communities, with no previous history of mining. They 
have no choice but to learn, as they have no prior experience. Companies can 
introduce new technologies because the workforce is willing to learn.  
What the implementation team did when they realised the Operators were fairly 
new to the production environment, was to find a theme that would automatically 
appeal to them when implementing the 3108a machine. The Operators at 
Merensky Mine are between 24 – 30 years’ old, and they are really keen football 
team supporters. It was realised that if the Operators are to own the 3108a 
process, then we should give them a football flavour they will relate to even after 
working hours. It was then that the implementation team brought in the ‘soccer 
role model’ theme. The best Operators were compared to local soccer players 
and consistent performers were compared to international soccer players (Refer 
to Appendix 1). 
The people in the Eastern Limb area are highly religious so any theme that is 
brought in must not be seen to contradict their belief system. The implementation 
team found the ‘soccer role model’ angle resonated very well with the Eastern 
Limb Operators.  
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When the TPS (Toyota Production System or Lean Manufacturing) principles 
were rolled out as stated by Vogt and Hattingh (2015) it found Operators and 
maintenance staff who were willing to adopt the principles and practice them 
according to the four frames:  
i) Performance mind-set 
ii) Problem awareness 
iii) Solving problems the right way 
iv) Developing people through problem solving. 
Macfarlane (2001) explains an aspect the Roll-out team needs to take into 
account is that new technology may bring about new work practices, and to 
address this properly the implementation team has to actively engage the 
organised labour. The A3 process actions in Table 6a state that some of the 
KPIs and bonus agreement changes need organised labour to be consulted and 
for new agreements to be structured and signed off.  
Macfarlane (2001) raises the safety and business training part for the Operators 
over and above the technical competence. Macfarlane states, “A critical 
component of whether technology is appropriate is the issue of competency and 
skill level. An early imperative is to assess the profile of the workforce required 
for the technology or new work method, and to provide selection procedures and 
training which will allow the development of the required competencies identified 
during work cycles, task listing and structure, to be done timeously. 
The training requirement should address the issues such as: 
 Competency to operate the technology 
 Understanding of the business and contribution to it by productive and 
efficient work 
 Understanding of any risks and hazards associated with the technology 
 Adequate levels of cross-skilling, commensurate with the work system.” 
Issues raised by Macfarlane (2001) were addressed in this research through 
structured Roll-out posters, A3 report findings and the resulting action plan, 
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physical on-site observations to address machine and training gaps. Lastly, it 
was also addressed through communicating results to Operators and recognising 
the outstanding performers. 
Botha (2016) identifies that the integration of mining and Engineering staff targets 
can yield positive results. Addressing integration is a key challenge for improving 
productivity and requires an approach that breaks down the silos and adopt an 
end-to-end perspective. Achieving this will require empowering the workforce, 
finding new solutions to existing problems, and using data and technology to 
support this. 
Catchpole and Robbins (2015) states that PwC (PricewaterhouseCoopers) 
analysis has argued mining employees are the key to the biggest productivity 
gains; the research identifies synergy between mining and mineral processing 
teams.  
The author confirms the same can be true for synergy between mining and 
engineering personnel at mine operational level.  
Catchpole and Robbins (2015) identifies significant productivity gains will be 
realised if work practices are improved. The Booysendal Mine implementation 
team also realised that the SOPs and minor machine modifications can yield 
significant productivity gains if addressed on time.  
Here are extracts from Catchpole and Robbins (2015) that supports a focus on 
systems rather than solely on people: “Productivity is heavily dependent on the 
way people act. A better-rated piece of equipment might deliver 5 – 10 percent 
output improvement and require additional capital, but, changes in the work 
practices can, in our experience, deliver 20 percent + gains, often at little or no 
cost. (PwC 2014, p 2).  
Recent mining industry productivity analysis focuses on the central importance of 
people in connecting the various elements of mining activity so that potential 
improvements are realised.  
KPMG analysis notes the opportunities in integration of mining and mineral 
processing activities. It argues that integrated production planning brings together 
both the mining and processing functions to create greater efficiency through 
better governance, planning, communication and execution, viewing the mine’s 
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value chain as a single system. (KPMG 2013, p 11). It discusses the central role 
of careful planning and the development of performance measures and 
performance monitoring to achieve the desired behaviours on the ground. 
The previous two paragraphs show that if the Booysendal implementation team 
continually does physical on-site observations, and amends the SOPs to 
identified processes, it could yield long-lasting performance solutions. 
Figure 4h shows that through structured system and process enhancements, an 
18% improvement in square metres produced has been achieved. 
5.3 Mining Process gaps and mining systems issues identified 
It was identified early in the research, in sub-section 4.1 under the A3 
countermeasures that physical observations had to be done to optimise the bolt 
installation process. In subsections 4.3 and 4.5 observations and time-studies 
were done, and it was also realised there is potential to improve the bolt 
installation cycle time by 2.0 minutes.  
Areas identified that can be improved are: 
(i) Reduced average duration to move and set up machine from installed 
bolt to collaring of hole 2 
(ii) Reduce duration to position boom 
What the implementation team observed is that the support Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs) of another OEM Roof bolter on the mine were taken as is 
without assessing the impact on the actual practical operation of the 3108a Roof 
bolter. The team concluded that an issue-based risk assessment and drafting of 
‘fit-for-purpose’ SOPs would be done to align the following SOPs: 
(i) Marking off Roof bolts support grids 
(ii) Sequence of Roof bolts installation 
(iii) Marking off Cable anchors 
(iv) Sequence of Cable anchors installation 
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Over and above the support installation process optimisation through work 
practices change, the author scrutinised the research articles of highly efficient 
mechanised mining operations to understand what areas of systems optimisation 
were looked at and how was it done. The following few paragraphs will be 
unpacking practical examples to be emulated at the Booysendal Merensky Shaft. 
According to Dunstan et al. (2006), Rio Tinto Aluminium introduced Lean 
Manufacturing to complement an existing Six Sigma business improvement 
program and to achieve continuous improvement activities at a workplace level.  
In a short time, Lean has achieved good and sometimes spectacular results 
improving productivity and efficiency at all sites, including the mining site. The 
author mentioned this Lean process to the implementation team and they were 
sceptical as some of the team members have been on the mines for more than 
25 years and they have seen impractical processes being imposed on mining 
teams by Consultants without success. However, in this case, the team, although 
sceptical, looked at how the Rio Tinto team applied Lean practically.  
Dunstan et al. (2006) explains what was done at Northparkes Mines as follows: 
“Development of underground excavations follows a cyclical process that is 
repeated every 12 to 24 hours. The development cycle, undertaken by a crew of 
five to six miners, consists of: 
(i) Drilling a pattern of blast holes into the rock face 
(ii) Charging blast holes with explosives and firing 
(iii) Mucking out broken rock 
(iv) Supporting the new section of the tunnel with ground support 
elements including meshing, rock bolts and spray-on concrete”. 
Lean was called in to control and improve advance rates which vary between 
three and five metres per cycle. A key feature of Lean is its ability to manage a 
large number and a variety of issues simultaneously, using visual prompts to 
assist the communication of issues.  
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A Lean information centre was established in the project’s shift change centre. 
The metrics the development team chose to track were:  
 Safety  
 Environment  
 Employee availability  
 Cycle completion times  
 Weekly development targets  
 Utilisation of resources  
The Merensky Shaft Operational Technology Champion, Nigel Reeder sprang 
into action and changed the traditional waiting place to a Lean information centre. 
The underground waiting place was now used by both the mining team and the 
maintenance staff to jointly review and assess production progress both at the 
start and end of a shift.  
The Merensky team decided they will track the following metrics with regard to 
3108a implementation:  
 Number of bolts installed by an Operator per shift  
 Number of bords supported by an Operator per shift 
 Time the machine started bolting 
 How many faces were blasted due to bolter bolting on time.  
The implementation team was amazed by the level of interest and participation 
that came about at the Merensky Shaft just from turning the waiting place from a 
traditional gathering centre into a Lean Information centre. However, one needs 
to understand the main ‘draw point’ of this system lies in the visual Management 
of information. For example, Nigel Reeder took photographs of all 3108a 
Operators and recorded the number of bolts installed per shift next to their 
photographs.  
It was a magical innovation as every Operator wanted to see outstanding results 
next to his photograph. Performance focused conversations started emerging 
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between Engineering staff and the Operators on how they could get better results 
than the previous shift and at the end of shift they debriefed on their agreed 
actions. 
Yingling, Detty and Sottile JR (2000) explains the main difference between a 
traditional production control using push system used at mines versus a pull 
production control using a just-in-time system. The author first studied the 
principles brought forward by Yingling et al. (2000) and then drew up a mining 
customised pull system. It produced outstanding results. Here are the principles 
as set out by Yingling et al. (2000): 
(i) Traditional production control that is utilised at mines is push. In such 
a system, work is scheduled by initiating the job at the beginning of 
the production sequence. The job orders respond to committed or 
anticipated delivery dates and the timing calculation involves an 
estimate of the production lead times. 
(ii) In contrast, just-in-time systems employ a pull production control. Pull 
differs from push in that jobs are authorised, not scheduled. The 
authorisation is often communicated in the form of a Kanban card.  
First, the definition of a ‘workstation’ in a pull system differs from case 
to case. A group of sequential operations in a continuous flow would 
typically be treated as a single workstation in a pull system and a 
secondary production control system would be utilised between the 
operations within the workstation.  
Second, variants of this system are available for operations that, 
because of extensive setup requirements or process operating 
characteristics, must produce in large batches. Called signal Kanban 
systems, the production authorisation is sent when inventory of a 
particular product drops below a particular level. 
With the above principles in mind, the implementation team customised a 
Kanban-type card system used between miners at the start of shift. The miner 
from the previous shift would write all the activities that have been completed in a 
formalised card, detailing bords that have been cleaned, supported and drilled to 
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be charged up. This information is co-ordinated by the section Mine Overseer at 
the start of the shift and the number of bolts installed per shift is assessed.  
This simplified activity authorisation system not only checks the effectiveness of 
the support installation process, but it also guarantees the mining cycle 
optimisation as the mechanised mining process execution is cyclical and 
sequential.  
5.4 Correlation of stoping width and dilution 
Throughout the period of this study, the planned stoping width of 1.9m was not 
achieved. It was identified as at July 2016 that stoping width still needed to 
improve by 9cm. By May 2017, instead of improvement, we had a further 
deterioration of 28cm. The 37cm overbreak was due to hanging wall challenges 
on the low wall side. This overbreak resulted in the achieved shaft head grade 
consistently staying between 2.39 – 2.42g/ton. This dilution challenge meant that 
since the start of the Merensky Shaft Project, the planned shaft head grade of 
2.55g/ton was not achieved. The dilution challenge ends up negatively impacting 
the profitability of the project. It is critical that this issue is addressed. 
Besides the hanging wall challenge on the low wall side of the bords, it was 
realised that there will always be two bords in the rig section of 9 bords that will 
be mined at 2.5m mining height. The first bord to be mined at 2.5m within the 
section is the belt/tip strike drive to ensure conveyor infrastructure installation. 
The second one is the first bord above the belt strike drive to ensure 
transportation of bulk infrastructure into the section.  
To maintain the profitability of the Merensky Project, the stoping width planned 
target stayed at 1.9m with the two bords mined at 2.5m. This could be done by 
mining the other seven bords between 1.8 – 1.7m stoping width (See Appendix 
4 to understand how this is a realistic, achievable target). It can be seen that in 
Appendix 4 stoping mapping reports there are proven instances where the low 
wall side was between 1.6 – 1.8m, and the high wall was mined between 1.8 - 
2.0m. The actual stoping width achieved here proved that mining between 1.7 to 
1.85 m is realistic and achieved frequently in some of the bords at the Merensky 
Shaft. 
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5.5 Effect of 3108a utilisation on mining cycle 
Mid-year results of bolts installed per shift shows a shift from 50% to 67% for the 
19 - 42 bolts. Already by mid-year the achieved square metres are above the 
planned 1 900 due to 2.5 bords supported per shift.  
The December 2017 forecast based on the actions planned in Table 6a shows 
that the 19 – 42 installed bolts category will be standing at 84%. This forecast is 
based on incremental planned actions.  
When completed, this will result in the planned 3 bords per shift. Six bords 
blasted in a day will yield a total of 2 566m² achieved per month consistently, 
compared to the desired 1 900m². What is fundamental to note here is that 
Lonmin achieved 2 400m² per month consistently in an XLP system with two 
suites of equipment because the XLP mining system still required development to 
be done with LP equipment.  
Now, Booysendal Mine has already achieved the 2 401m² and it is planned to 
achieve 166m² above this level with a single suite of LP equipment. Many 
mechanised mining implementers fail to take suite requirement into consideration 
when deciding between XLP and LP method, so a fair comparison is not made 
before the Roll-out of new systems. 
5.6 Residual 3108a challenges 
The remaining challenges that will need to be considered to further optimise the 
3108a implementation over and above the Table 6a actions are: 
 Positioning of boom 
Moving the machine from one completed hole and positioning the drill 
feed/or turret over the new marked position to be proved to vary 
significantly from one to another, at times having 4 minutes difference. 
This is the area that provides a significant chance to improve in order to 
achieve 8 minutes per bolt from the current average of 10.54 minutes. 
 Laser or camera 
This also has to do with moving the machine from one hole to the next 
and positioning the Drill feed on the target. Operators suggested that a 
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camera or lasers be looked at in order to make it easy to position on 
target. 
 Capsule gun to insert resin into the drilled hole 
Other OEM Roof bolters at Booysendal Mine have resin shooting capsule 
guns. The GHH machine does not have this feature due the length of 
capsules used at Merensky Shaft. Investigate the machine mounted 
compressors with the capability to shoot 500mm – 700mm resins. This 
will eliminate the manual handling of resin capsules. 
 Critical spares availability and construction of underground satellite 
workshop 
GHH need to consider setting up a warehouse in Lydenburg or 
Steelpoort. This warehouse must be better resourced to ensure machines 
don’t wait unnecessarily for spares. Also, an on-site critical spares list is 
to be drawn up to ensure items are kept in stock. A satellite workshop is 
to be planned and be blasted on time while advancing the production 
faces. This will improve the MTTR (mean time to repair) units after 
breakdown is reported. 
5.7 Conclusion 
It is significant to note in Chapter 5 that the results in Table 8 can be used by 
OEMs, Strategic Planning teams and Mining Fund Analysts to benchmark when 
doing Equipment selection, Production Optimisation and Mine Efficiency 
Analysis.  
This chapter further unpacked how the people/human issues identified in Figure 
4a were addressed and how the method of addressing these issues confirms or 
contrasts what other industry studies have revealed. The modus operandi of 
addressing the people issues was further reinforced/affirmed by Lean or TPS 
tactics used in the industrial manufacturing sector. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND RESEARCH 
OPPORTUNITIES 
6.1 Conclusions 
The introduction of new technology, as in the case with Roof bolter 3108a, 
although a complex social process, can and must be carefully planned and 
managed. The Structured Roll-out process in Appendix 1 and the A3 process in 
Appendix 2 show that 3108a implementation team really took heed of the 
guidelines given by Pickering (2004), and acted accordingly.  
The 3108a technology transfer route followed by the implementation team 
delivered the following results when linked to the study objectives and questions: 
 What worked well in this case study was the use of Lean visual indicators, 
the use of visual representation of key production performance data was 
well accepted by Operators as means to communicate and improve their 
performance.  
 The implementation team realised early when the project started that the 
key feature of Lean is its ability to manage a large number and variety of 
issues simultaneously using visual prompts to assist in communication of 
issues. This was done successfully through use of posters (e.g. 
Appendix 1) and the performance tracking boards at underground 
waiting places/information centres. 
 The value of observational methods used in this case study is that it 
provided answers to ‘what’ phenomena occurred, particularly when 
Operators are involved in the process, along with insights into ‘why’ it 
occurred. Through observational methods the implementation team 
understood the exact operational gaps that led to failure to consistently 
achieve 8 minutes per installed bolt. From the time studies conducted in 
this research, two areas were identified within the bolting cycle where 
improvements could be made to achieve the 8 minutes per bolt. 
 The results of time studies combined with experience gained from 
observational methods provided the implementation with practical, proven 
solution to address the gap between the planned 8 minutes per installed 
bolt and the actual achieved 10.54 minutes per bolt. The fusing of time 
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studies and observational tools provides a ‘Solving problems the right 
way’ mindset from the Operators right through to the Project Champion. 
 The A3 process followed in this case study allowed a stepped approach 
that recognised the unacceptable performance level that the 3108a Roof 
bolter initially delivered. The process allowed two main implementation 
stages stating detailed actions that could be tracked to realise first the 
1750 m2/month and then ultimately 1900 m2/month. Through the stepped 
approach in this case study we managed to deliver exceptional production 
results six months ahead of planned timeframe, in May 2017 we 
surpassed 2400 m2. 
It must also be stated that there were failures in the implementation of the 3108a 
bolter.  The first failure as the fact that the 1900mm stoping width was not 
achieved. Second failure, instead of achieving the planned 8 minutes per bolt  the 
Operators were consistently achieving only 10.54 minutes per bolt. 
The initial plan was to increase the number of times Operators installed 35 – 42 
bolts per shift from 3% to 15% by December 2017. Mid-year results show the 
final results will be 9% in this category.  
The planned increase in the 19-34 bolts per shift was from 47% to 60% by 
December 2017. Mid-year results show the final results will be 75%.   
The conclusion the author reached is that the number of times Operators achieve 
19-42 bolts per shift will improve from mid-year achieved results of 67% to 84%. 
This will have a positive impact on the operation achieving its planned mining 
cycle on shift to shift basis. As a result, the 2401m² achieved in May 2017 will be 
repeated and even surpassed as of December 2017 when all the actions 
identified in Tables 6a and 6b have been completed. 
Although the 8 minutes per bolt was not achieved, the research confirmed the 10 
minutes per bolt achievements of both Lonmin and Anglo American Platinum 
mines. Fundamental areas of improvement for achieving the much needed 2 
minutes improvements were identified.  
The results of this study can be used by Project Planning teams when doing Mine 
Feasibility studies for Mechanised underground mines, and operational mines 
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Engineers when convincing their Executives on what will they achieve if they 
convert from conventional Roof bolting methods to mechanised methods.  
The study also gives OEM machine designers actual figures to work with as a 
base for their design assumptions, rather than relying solely on simulated 
performance figures. 
6.2 Recommendations 
Through physical observational methods and time studies conducted it became 
clear that 3108a technology still required some minor modifications which will be 
listed below. Before dealing with further modifications it must the stated that it 
became evident that for successful technology transfer an experienced 
implementation team must assess and evaluate the appropriateness of the 
current SOPs and its impact on the Roll-out. In this case study it was identified 
that there were two to three SOPs that had to be amended. 
Challenges experienced when drilling and installing 4.5m long anchors, as 
explained in sub-section 4.4, will require a separate study. Through interrogating 
the OEM Engineers and the mine Operational team I gathered suggestions and 
areas that can be recommended for this study. OEM Engineers directed that 
GHH Roof bolters designers must look at: 
 Incorrect chuck adaptor for the 1 1/8 steel 
 Feed pressure is too high resulting in a curved hole making retrieving the 
rod difficult 
The Operational team recommended the following actions be effected: 
 Thrust pressure 
An OEM specialist to come on-site to check the pressure and if necessary 
adjust it to ensure we don’t have over thrusting. To reduce breakages on 
the Drill steel, we need to ensure the cutters maintain the correct hole 
diameter. In order to do that, we need to reduce the wear on the outer 
edge of the cutters. Excess wear is caused by over thrusting. We are 
monitoring the results. 
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 Correct chuck adaptors are also on site to reduce Drill steel breakages 
and we addressed the extraction of the Drill steel. The Drill steel should 
be rotated on extraction to ensure ease of extraction. Clips have been 
reintroduced to aid with this. A slide hammer will also be issued to aid in 
the extraction of broken steel. 
6.3 Further research opportunities 
This study has proved that the 3108a bolter can deliver a highly efficient system 
which can consistently deliver above 1900m² per month. However, earlier in the 
report it was made clear that if the Merensky operation is to remain profitable and 
appealing to investors, the system must also reduce dilution.  
The hanging wall Geology on the low wall side poses a significant risk to the 
dilution reduction target. The author suggests two separate studies be 
undertaken to solve this. 
The first study will focus on understanding the hanging wall jointing in the 
Booysendal Lease area. There are no mines mining the Merensky reef in the 
Eastern Limb. As a result, there are no written technical papers on this subject, 
so this study will have to start from scratch.  
The second study will use the hanging wall mapping results to design a blast 
round and its matching explosives for the Merensky hanging wall strata. 
Booysendal Mine UG2 Shaft is currently rolling out a support system that 
combines both a primary and secondary support function through a single unit. 
On completion of this project, the results should be analysed and a ‘fit-for-
purpose’ support system, similar to the one of the UG2 Shaft, should be adapted 
to the Merensky Shaft.  
In sub-section 4.4, the challenge posed by long anchors drilling and installation 
was identified. This challenge results in counter-productive behaviour amongst 
Roof bolter Operators as they start planning with the Drill rig Operators to open 
the stoping width above the planned 1.9m.  
The author recommends the planned actions in sub-section 6.2 be completed 
and closed out while the flexibolt support system project is in progress at the 
UG2 Shaft. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: STRUCTURED ROLL-OUT POSTER 
Why is it so critical that we use the GHH Bolter?
The main objectives for introducing the ADE Bolter at Merensky Shaft and related Key
Performance Indicators are:
The objective is to produce 1 900 m² at 235 m system face advance in stoping to yield 11 500
tons per rig section at a defined stoping width of 1900 mm.
In order to achieve the desired output as specified per rig section of 235 m per month, the
3108a ADE Bolter must perform as per the following KPIs:
(i) Drill and install a 1.75 m resin applied rock bolt in 8 min.
(i) Bolt installation times, including movement between bords, should be in the region of 2 hrs
thus allowing for the flexibility of supporting 3 bords in the available 7 hrs face time.
(i) The bolter must be able to install bolts in stoping widths ranging from 1700 to 2000 mm in
order to achieve the defined stoping width of 1900 mm.
(i) The bolter must be capable to install hanging wall rock bolts at least 0,5m from the
development bord face or sidewall.
From June 2016 to date : What is the actual output per operator?
GHH Bolter Application at the Merensky Shaft
NPL needs Merensky reef to blend with 
UG2 concentrate at the Smelter
Merensky reef also has important 
minerals such as Cu and Ni
Successful execution of this shaft output 
will lead to opening up of additional 
Merensky shafts
We need and value your constructive 
input, criticism and participation for this 
Endeavour.
What is the expected output (i.e. Leagues) for different operator 
calibre?
League Output
Premier League 42+ Bolts
First Division League 19 – 35  Bolts
Relegation Squad Less 19 Bolts per shift
League Output (three months consistent)
Elite League (EP/ EU / NIG. / CAM. 
squad)
42 and occasionally touching the 
50 mark
SA Premier type and World class Elites …..
Before thinking World class elites first crack the SA best record…..
Has this expected output ever been done consistently in South Africa?
“Best of the Best” : World Class How will we know if we have achieved our MAIN GOAL?
Measured parameter Actual Required
m/month or m2/month per Stoping 
Section 
235m /1900m2
Stoping width/height (S/W) 1900 mm
Grade 2,85 g/ton
Tons/month per Stoping Section 11 500 tonnes
Bolts per operator per shift 42
Bords Supported per operator per shift 3
GHH Bolter  
applicaƟon at the 
Merensky ShaŌ 
World 
Class 
Beat
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APPENDIX 2: A3 REPORT OF THE GHH BOLTER IMPLEMENTATION AT 
MERENSKY SHAFT 
  
Theme :  3108a Implementation at Merensky  
W Kekana 9512907N 
1. Company Goals FY 2022 
 Improved Safety = reduced 
exposure to risky zones 
 Increase annual output to    
75 kozpa 4E 
 Crew performance per    
section 1900 m² 
 Lower cost per ton              
(ZAR 500.00/ton) 
 Modular roll out of new 
mechanised shafts 
3. Current equipment utilization status 
 
2. Booysendal Platinum Goals FY 2017 
 OPEX ≥ ZAR 15,000.00/4E oz 
 Increase productivity by 17,25%
(Current 12 average 1575 m²/crew) 
 Maintain stoping width at 1900 mm 
to control dilution 
 Install 42 bolts per 7,5 hours face 
time 
 Complete Mining cycle per shift 
Current Condition 
50% of the bolter operators are achieving less than 19 bolts per shift whilst using an upgraded 3108 machine : Is it a machine or operator or process issue? 
Goal 
By December 2017: 
I. Increase number of times operators get +35 bolts from 3% to 15% 
II. Increase number of times operators get 19 – 34 bolts from 47% to 60% 
III. Achieve 1900 m²/crew from the current 1575 m²/crew 
Suspected Cause Action Item Responsible Due Finding 
i. Personal impact Structured roll-out involving OEMs, mining 
crews and maintenance staff 
Ops Manager + Impl. 
team 
01/17 Done (Communication poster Appendix 1) 
ii. Implementation involvement of operational 
teams 
Structured roll-out involving OEMs, mining 
crews and maintenance staff 
Ops Manager + Impl. 
team 
01/17 Done (Communication poster Appendix 1) 
iii. Benefit realisation & Recognition of operators Visible daily tracked information at U/G 
waiting place + surface info. centre 
Mine Over. 
Nigel Reeder 
01/17 Already started + have recognised 1st Quarter 
iv. Incorrect KPI for Eng. and Mining Measure both for Utilisation and availability 
not separately 
Ops and Eng Mgrs 06/17 We need to get ‘buy-in’ of organised labour 
first 
v. Incorrect Shift KPI Measure Cycle completion per shift Ops and Eng Mgrs 06/17 We need to get ‘buy-in’ of organised labour 
first 
vi. Operator daily output not ranked Currently being ranked to set benchmark for 
bonus scheme specifications 
Mine Over. 
Nigel Reeder 
01/17 Already started + have recognised 1st Quarter 
vii. Continued improvement not communicated Physical observations of bolts installation 
process – not simulations but practical 
Impl. Team 06/17 Already started, learnings to be shared in the 
report 
viii. Complexity vs Simplicity 3108 to 3108a 
(operator ergonomics considered) 
Physical observations of bolts installation 
process – not simulations but practical 
Impl. Team 06/17 Early learnings is that modifications or  
upgrades were not communicated well 
ix. OEM alignment = only fit-for-purpose changes Physical observations of bolts installation 
process – not simulations but practical 
Impl. Team 06/17 Already did a major change to the support 
canopy’ s ducks foot 
x. Review SOPs = grids marking, cable anchors 
installation, sequence of bolting & h/wall blast 
techniques 
Physical observations of bolts installation 
process – not simulations but practical 
Impl. Team 06/17 Already identified three SOPs that are prob-
lematic & need for blasting technique change 
xi. Poor preparation from shift to shift Bring a bonus measure component Ops Mgr 06/17 We need to get ‘buy-in’ of organised labour 
first 
xii. No Kanban card (Structured handover system) Formalise shift exchange cards Ops Mgr 06/17 To be drawn up first 
Effect Confirmation 
12.5 % improvement over 9 months is quite steep but can be achieved! 
Follow-up Actions 
Root Cause Analysis 
Background Countermeasures 
Investigation  item Responsible Due Status 
i. Review SOPs = grids marking, cable anchors installation, sequence of bolting & h/
wall last techniques 
Wonderboy & Zirk Jansen 06/17 To address the gaps identified during physical observa-
tions 
ii. Scrutinise the Effect of Soccer ‘stars’ in recognising best performing Bolt opera-
tors (Pull effect or not?) 
Wonderboy & Nigel Reeder 12/17 Already recognised the 1st Quarter performers 
iii. Using on-board camera or lasers for positioning of the turret over ‘target’ sup-
port holes 
Robbin Pearce & Cules Kolbe 12/17 Do proposal to the OEM and Senior Management ap-
proval 
iv. Visit to Mimosa and Bathopele Mines to learn if they have any further enhance-
ments (SOPs, Bonus system, machine modifications or handover system) 
Wonderboy & Nigel Reeder 06/17 OEMs are willing to facilitate these visits as they cur-
rently have machines in these operations 
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APPENDIX 3: EXTERNAL PARTY OBSERVATIONS WHEN THE ROLL-OUT 
WAS DONE 
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APPENDIX 4: EXTRACTS OF MAPPING REPORTS SHOWING 1.9M STOPING WIDTH 
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APPENDIX 5: MERENSKY SHAFT PLANNED CAPEX AND THE EARLY 
WORKS DONE PRIOR TO GHH ROOF BOLTER PROJECT START UP IN 
JUNE 2016 
 
Figure 5 (i): Capital spent and the work in progress of the Merensky Shaft  
(Source: Northam Platinum Limited) 
BOOYSENDAL NORTH
BNM (Merensky) – Performance to date 
